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Kenneth L. Failor ("Mr. Failor"), Premium Plastics, Inc. fTPI") and Mary Gilmer,
("Mrs. Gilmer") respectfully submit this Brief of the Appellants. Collectively, they are
sometimes hereinafter referred to as "Premium Plaintiffs".
L
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
A N D PRESERVATION BELOW
Issue 1: Whether the district court erred in granting Defendant's Motion to Strike
Jury Demand, effectively dismissing all of the Premium Plaintiffs legal claims and denying
the Premium Plaintiffs' right to a jury trial, all of which is contrary to Rule 53 (e) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Art. 1 Section 10 of the Utah Constitution.
Standard of Review: The district court's denial of the Premium Plaintiffs' right to a
jury trial on the basis that this is only an equitable accounting case is a legal conclusion which
is reviewed for correctness. See OLPy LLC v. l&urningham, 2008 UT App 173 U 11.
Preservation of Issue in District Court: The Premium Plaintiffs preserved this
issue below in:
Their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike Jury Demand
and for Judgment on the Special Master's Final Report (R. 2374-76);
Their Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike
the Jury Demand and for Judgment on the Master's Report (R. 6324-26; 6330-37);
and

1
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Oral argument at hearing on March 6, 2008 (R. 6716).
Issue 2: Whether the district court erred in denying the Premium Plaintiffs'
Objections to the Master's Ex Parte Process and Final Report?
Standard of Review: The district court's rejection of the Premium Plaintiffs
objections to the report of the Special Master under Rule 53 is the interpretation of a jule of
civil procedure which is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Vlumb v. State, 809
P.2d 734, 741 (Utah 1990), Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 U T A p p 303, \ 9,141 P.3d 629.
Preservation of Issue in District Court: the Premium Plaintiffs preserved this
issue below in:
Their Objections to the Final Report of the Special Master (R. 840-1109);
Their Supplemental Memorandum Re: Objections to the Master's Report (R. 633037); and
Oral argument at hearing on March 6, 2008 (R. 6716).
Issue 3: Whether the district court erred in denying the Premium Plaintiffs' Motion
to File an Amended Complaint?
Standard of Review: The district court's denial of the Premium Plaintiffs request to
file an amended complaint is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. See Fishbaugh v. Utah
Voiver<&Ught, 969 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1998) (citing Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86,
92 (Utah 1992)).
Preservation of I s s u e in District Court: The Premium Plaintiffs preserved this
issue below in:
Their Motion for Leave to File an Amended Consolidated Complaint (R.6527-6585);

2
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Their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File an Amended
Consobdated Complaint (R 6678-87), and
Oral argument at hearing on March 6, 2008 (R 6716)

IL
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The determinative Constitutional provisions, rules and statutes are as follows
United States Constitution, 7th Amend.
In [s]uits at common law, where the value m controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved "
Utah Constitution, Art. I Sec. 10.
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate In court so
general jurisdiction, except m capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors
In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors In criminal
cases the verdict shall be unanimous In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors
may find a verdict A jury m a civil case shall be waived unless demanded
Utah Code Ann. § 78-21-1. Right to jury trial.
In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal property,
with or without money damages, or for money claimed as due
upon contract or as damages for breach of contract, or for
injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jury, unless a jury is
waived or a reference is ordered
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time
before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action not been
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it any time within 20
days after it is served Otherwise a party may his pleading only by leave
of court or by written consent of the adverse party, and leave shall be
freely given where justice so requires
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 38. Jury trial of right.
3
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(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by
The constitution or as given by statute shall be preserved
to the parties.
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue
triable of right by a jury by paying the statutory fee and
serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing
at any time after the commencement of the action and not
later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading
directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed
upon a pleading of the party.
U t a h Rule of Civil Procedure 53(c):
The order of reference to the may specify or limit his powers and may
direct him to report only upon particular issues or to do or perform
particular acts or to receive and report evidence only and may fix the
time and place for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing
of the master's report.
U t a h Rule of Civil Procedure 53 (e)(3):
Injury actions. In an action to be tried by a jury the master shall not be
directed to report the evidence. His finding upon the issues submitted
to him are admissible as evidence of the matters found and may be
read to the jury, subject to the ruling of the court upon any objections
in point of law which may be made to the report.

Ill
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and D i s p o s i t i o n B e l o w

This is a breach of royalty contract dispute. 1 Under the contracts at issue, MegaDyne
is required to pay plaintiffs Mr. Failor, Mr. Harvey Van Epps Gilmer 2 and Premium Plastics,

1

This is a consolidated case. The first case asked for damages and royalties earned up until
July 3 1 , 1998. The second case was for damages and royalties earned after July 31, 1998.
The two cases were consolidated on August 19, 2003. (R. 3363-3365, 3367-3371, and 34803482). Only in the first case was a Master appointed and only the first case is the subject of
the Interlocutory Order, appealed by the Premium Plaintiffs.
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Inc. and its owner Harvey Van E p p s Gilmer (collectively referred to herein as "the Premium
Plaintiffs") $0.05 and $0.06 as royalties for surgical tips and balls coated by MegaDyne with a
Teflon-like substance. In its Complaint and Jury Demand, the Premium Plaintiffs asserted
five claims: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing;
(3) unjust enrichment; (4) accounting; and (5) intentional and negligent misrepresentation
and non-disclosure. (R. 1-43).
After the Premium Plaintiffs filed the Complaint, the parties moved and obtained the
appointment of a Special Master. (R. 72-83). The Order of Reference required the Master
to prepare a report of his findings regarding the amount of MegaDyne's product coated and
the amount of MegaDyne's product sold under the agreements between the parties. (R. 86 ^j
4) Ex parte communications were strictly forbidden (R. 86-87, ^| 5).
Nevertheless, the Master used an ex parte process to gather and analyze MegaDyne's
documents. Also, the Master's report exceeded the Order of Reference by calculating what
the Master believed to be an overpayment of royalties. Objections to the Master ex parte
process, his failure to abide by the Order of Reference and his internally inconsistent report
were filed the Premium Plaintiffs. (R. 6330-6337, 2143-2185, and 846-1109)
Meanwhile, the Premium Plaintiffs successfully subpoenaed documents from third
party suppliers which showed that the Premium Plaintiffs were underpaid and that
MegaDyne had been successful in obtaining a patent infringement judgment based on a per
unit coated basis.

2

Mr. Gilmer, the owner of Premium Plastics, Inc., died during the proceedings below.
Consequently, his wife and trustee of Mr. Gilmer's Trust was substituted as a party plaintiff.
5
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Thereafter MegaDyne moved to strike the Premium Plaintiffs' jury demand and the
Premium Plaintiffs moved to amend the Complaint. (R. 4635-4637, 6527-6585). The trial
court denied the Premium Plaintiffs' objections to the Master's report, and their motion to
amend the complaint. The Court granted MegaDyne's motion to strike the jury demand.
(R. 6702-6705)
The Premium Plaintiffs subsequendy petitioned for permission to appeal the
interlocutory order of the trial court. Permission was granted on J u n e 27, 2008. (R. 6712).
B.
Background
1.

Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review
of Parties9 Relationship

Giving Rise to

Litigation

MegaDyne was initially incorporated April 17, 1985 as American Medical

Products, Inc. 3
2.

In 1987, Dr. Marsden Blanch, a founder of MegaDyne, filed his

application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office

("USPTO")

first

as the

purported inventor of an electrosurgical knife utilizing a two-step P T F E coating process. Dr.
Blanch's first application, filed on February 24, 1987, was issued as Patent N o . 4,785,807 (the
" ' 8 0 7 " patent) in 1988. O n March 19, 1987, Dr. Blanch assigned his rights in the technology
and products to MegaDyne. O n November 2, 1987, the U S P T O recorded the transfer of
Mr. Blanch's interests in the '807 patent to MegaDyne. (R. 6531).
3.

In February 1986, Mr. Failor began discussions with Harvey Van Epps Gilmer

("Mr. Gilmer"), a California chemical engineer and expert in plastic coatings. In June 1986,
Mr. Gilmer and his company Premium Plastics Inc. ("PPI") began to work on developing,
3

American Medical Products, Inc.'s name was changed to MegaDyne Medical Products, Inc.
on February 22, 1989. The company is hereinafter referred to as "MegaDyne."

6
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perfecting and applying the nonstick coating on electrosurgical blades for MegaDyne.

(R.

6531-32).
4.

Subsequently, Mr. Failor developed the prototype two-step coating process

for applying the P T F E to medical instruments. In 1986, Mr. Failor engaged Mr. Gilmer to
begin large-scale production of the medical instruments. By January 1987, Mr. Failor had
developed a protocol for processing MegaDyne's coated units for mass market production.
(R. 6531-32).
5.

Mr. Gilmer and PPI developed trade secrets consisting of a manufacturing

process for coating medical instruments with P T F E , including the detailed, sequential steps
involved, selecting products in connection with the process and improving on the coating
technology described in and covered by MegaDyne's '807 patent. (R. 6532).
6.

O n August 10, 1987, Dr. Blanch filed a division of the original c 807 patent.

That application issued as Patent N o . 4,876,110 on October 24, 1989. (R. 6532).
7.

In April of 1988, after Dr. Blanch's second patent filing, Mr. Failor entered

into a compensation agreement in which Mr. Failor was responsible for providing certain
services to MegaDyne in exchange for compensation. (R. 6532). The compensation
agreement provided that Mr. Failor would be paid based upon number of units of specified
products that were actually sold to and paid for by customers based on the following
schedule:
Agreement Year

Time Period

Compensation Per Unit

Year 1 -3

April 20,1988- April 19,191

$.08

Year 4

April 20,1991 - April 19,1992

$.07

7
393518v.4

Year 5

April 20, 1992 - April 19, 1993

$.06

Year 6

April 20, 1993 - April 19, 1997

$.05

(R. 6444). A copy of the Agreement is attached in the addendum.
8.

Under a June 1, 1988 Exclusive Product Coating Agreement, PP1 and Mr.

Gilmer agreed to and did provide MegaDyne with trade secrets developed in connection
with the coating process and cooperated with MegaDyne in perfecting the application for
MegaDyne's products. A copy of the Agreement is attached in the addendum. PPI and Mr.
Gilmer retained as their own proprietary trade secrets, certain refinements and technologies
developed on MegaDyne's behalf. (R. 6532).
9.

On or about March 26, 1991, PPI and Mr. Gilmer entered into an

"Agreement" (the "1991 Contract") with MegaDyne whereby PPI agreed to continue to
provide coating services to MegaDyne upon the terms and conditions of the 1988 Contract.
(R. 6533). A copy of the 1991 Contract is attached in the addendum.
10.

The parties further agreed under the 1991 Contract that MegaDyne would pay

Mr. Gilmer six cents ($.06) per product coated by MegaDyne or its designee, that Mr.
Gilmer would provide to MegaDyne the trade secret knowledge, expertise, formula and
methods of application and processing "learned by Mr. Gilmer and P P I " , to enable
MegaDyne to coat certain of MegaDyne's medical products. (R. 6533).
11.

Also under the 1991 Contract, MegaDyne agreed to provide to PPI and Mr.

Gilmer any and all records necessary to perform an audit to ensure MegaDyne's payment
compliance. The 1991 Contract further provides that, in the event an audit discloses a

8
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variance of greater than five percent (5%) between what was paid and what was due to Mr.
Mr. Gilmer, the cost of the audit would be borne by MegaDyne. (R. 6533).
12.

The 1991 Contract was modified by a "Contract Modification" (the "1991

Modification"), which was signed shordy after execution of the 1991 Contract. Pursuant to
the 1991 Modification, MegaDyne agreed to require present and future suppliers of metal
cautery tips and laparoscopic devices to provide copies of all invoices to Mr. Gilmer. (R.
6533). A copy of the 1991 Modification is attached in the addendum
13.

The 1991 Contract was further modified by a "Contract Modification" dated

September 15, 1997 (the "1997 Modification") whereby MegaDyne agreed to pay PPI six
cents ($.06) for each product coated by MegaDyne through September 30, 1997. (R. 6534).
14.

MegaDyne also agreed that beginning October 1, 1997, and continuing until

December 1, 2005, MegaDyne would pay to PPI six cents ($.06) for each coated Product
invoiced or shipped to a third party for use or resale, including samples and consignments,
and agreed that returns and bad debts would not be debited against payments due to PPI.
MegaDyne further agreed that it would make payments due to PPI on a monthly basis, with
payments to be made within a month and ten days after the end of each month and that it
would accompany each monthly payment with a computer printout reporting all coated
Electrodes invoiced a n d / o r shipped during the month with consecutive invoice numbers,
date, total Electrodes on each invoice and applicable lot numbers. (R. 6534).
15.

The cooperative relationship between the parties began to crumble after

MegaDyne took the coating process in-house and began paying royalties to the Premium
Plaintiffs. After receiving an average monthly payment of $22,642 in royalties in 1996, PPFs

9
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royalties reached a high point of $43,490 in March 1997, followed by an unexplained steep
decline, as follows.
Feb-97

$28,687

Mar-97
Apr-97
May-97
Jun-97
Jul-97
Aug-97
Sep-97
Oct-97

$43,490
$27,820
$2,144
$4,194
$7,758
$8,334
$11,375
0

Nov-97

$851

(R 481, ex. 3 to the Special Master's Report)
16.

The Premium Plaintiffs' efforts to resolve the disparities amicably were

unsuccessful. The reports that MegaDyne provided with the royalty payments failed to
support the payment amount made to Premium Plastics, Inc and Mr. Faiior. MegaDyne's
royalty reports did not include certain safeguards the contracts required to make the
accounting more transparent, such as lot numbers and consecutive invoices. Also, as the
years passed, the apparent growth of the company, evident in MegaDyne's expansion of
facilities and personnel, was not reflected in the royalties that the Premium Plaintiffs
received, which remained essentially flat over time. (R. 6535).
17.

This case was initiated by the Premium Plaintiffs on or about July 31, 1998,

after MegaDyne's federal lawsuit was dismissed pursuant to a Stipulation without Prejudice.
The Premium Plaintiffs' Complaint and Jury D e m a n d asserted legal claims for breach of
contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and misrepresentation/nondisclosure. The Complaint included alternative equitable claims for unjust enrichment and
for an accounting. (R. 1-43).

10
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Appointment
18.

of Special Master and Adoption of Order of Reference
The parties agreed in January 1999 to the appointment of a Special Master

under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53 to prepare a report on the amount of products
coated and sold. (R. 72-79).
19.

The Order of Reference, which specifically sets forth and limits the duties of

the Special Master, provided that the Special Master act pursuant to the Order of Reference
in determining the amount of products coated and sold. Specifically, the Order of Reference
provides:
The issues relating to the amount of the Defendant's products coated and the
Defendant's coated products sold under the Agreements are hereby referred
to the Master.
(R. 84-90). Order of Reference ("Order") ^j3, a copy is attached hereto in the addendum.
20.

The Order of Reference also provided:
•

That the Master meet with parties to establish a work plan for the
preparation of the Special Master's report and comply with certain
deadlines in preparing and submitting his report to the trial court
(Order at % 6(a);

•

That the Special Master not engage in any improper ex parte
communications with the parties to the litigation (Order at ^j 5);

•

That the Special Master may conduct discovery and require the
production of books, papers, documents, vouchers, etc. (Order at ^j
5);

•

Work Plan/

That the Special Master submit his report to the trial court and to the
parties along with copies of all evidence relied upon by the Master to
support the findings in the report (Order at ^ 6(d)).

Deadlines

11
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21.

The Premium Plaintiffs submitted a proposed work plan to the Special Master

but he neither accepted nor rejected the Premium Plaintiffs' proposed work plan.

In fact,

the Master refused to establish a work place of the preparation of his report. When the
Premium Plaintiffs inquired about creating a work plan, the Master said that he would do
those tasks as he "deemed necessary." (R. 1235).
22.

The Master never did establish a plan with counsel for both parties before

March 2, 1999 as required by the Order of Reference. Instead, as stated by the Master
before Judge Thorne, "w7e did not want to disclose [a] work plan to the parties because that
would be basically tipping our hand as to what areas we were going to examine." (R. 123536).
23.

The Master failed to provide the court with a status report by the deadline in

the Order of Reference and instead filed it 400 days later. (R. 1239).
24.

The Master failed to complete his work by April 23, 2000, as ordered by the

trial court, or submit a letter to the court indicating anything additional that needed to be
done. Rather the Special Master never submitted a letter to the court, did not request an
extension and did not file his draft report until June 16, 2000. (R. 430-645). His final report
was later filed on August 2, 2000 (R. 803-833).
Improper
25.

Ex Parte

Process

From the beginning of his work until the Master submitted his final report,

the Master used an unfair ex parte process. MegaDyne's former accountant testified:
A:

They came out early May, two people, I believe
***
A:
They were there for weeks.
Q:
Did you give them a r o o m to work out of?
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A:
Q:
A:

The conference room.
Out at MegaDyne?
Yes
* **

Q:
About how often would you meet with the
folks from Ernst and Young?
A:
Well, I would only come to the office on
Monday, Wednesday, and Friday.
* **
Q:

So you would go out there three times a

week?
A:
Most of the time, they would be there,
there may be a day or two when they were not.
Q:
Is that it?
A:
Right
* **
Q:
W h o else from MegaDyne, if you know,
met with the folks at Ernst and Young besides you?
A:
1 know Brian did.
Q:
Anybody else?
A:
They asked Jeff Roberts to give them
electronic information from time to time . . . . I know
that he had conversations with them about exactly what
they needed and he gave them disks.
(R. 1237-38).
26.

The Master admitted that he conducted his document investigation at

MegaDyne, with MegaDyne, and on an ex parte basis:
U p o n our arrival at MegaDyne, we were introduced to key
accounting and manufacturing personnel, given a tour of the
facilities, and shown to the conference room. T h e conference
r o o m contained approximately 10 to 15 boxes of sales invoices,
general ledger detail for the period under inspection, receipts
and invoices and other financial records. . . . We reviewed,
inspected, analyzed and obtained support for and brief
explanations of electronic and paper forms of documents that
we deemed necessary to determine the number of products
coated and sold under the invoices.
(R. 1238).
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27.

The Master also engaged in improper ex parte communications by asking that

"MegaDyne prepare[| a schedule . . . that indicated the quantity recejved and the quantity
coated" to determine the amount of products coated. The Master then spot checked with
copies of invoices. (R. 1239).
Failure to Conduct
28.

Discovery

Throughout the proceedings, the Master never issued one subpoena and never

served any Rule 34 Request for Production of Documents. Consequently, it was impossible
for the parties to know what documents had been made available to the Master or the
documents on which the Master relied in reaching his decision. (R. 1236).
29.

MegaDyne has in its possession the following documents that would have

enabled the Master to determine the amount of products coated and products sold:
purchase orders to suppliers, receiving logs, shipping receipts, production schedules,
inspection documents, coating reports, coating process traveler reports, manufacturing
department inspection reports, quality control inspection reports, packaging documents,
sterilization certificates, balance sheets, income statements, cash flow documents, sales
journals, sales reports, unit activity reports, unit inventory reports, and packaging lists. The
Master, however, never obtained or relied upon those documents in preparing his r e p o r t (R.
1242).
30.

MegaDyne's former accountant testified that the Master was only given "a

small portion" of the financial statements, that no sales reports were provided for the time
prior to October 1, 1997, and that the unit activity reports and inventory reports, as well as
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the sales orders and packaging lists, were not asked for by or were not provided to the
Master. (R. 1243).
31.

The Master did state that he had access to original invoices. But he only

tested 61 out of 28,000 transactions. (R. 2129)
Unreliability

of Final

37.

Report

The Master failed to include with his report any documents, evidence o r

testimony relied upon in preparing the report. Instead of attaching relevant documents and
evidence to his final report as required by the Order of Reference, the Master attached to his
preliminary report schedules of payments, purchase, and units coated, all created by the
Master. The evidence and underlying and supporting documents used by the Master to
create his schedules to create his final report were not provided. (R. 1240-1241, 2125-2133).
36.

The basic documents relied upon by the Master do not support his findings in

the report. The following errors/inconsistencies reviewed by the Master were found by the
Premium Plaintiffs' expert:
•

Documents produced by the Master show that the amount of products
coated, at a minimum, is 397,306 pieces more than the number determined by
the Master; (R. 852).

•

The schedule of invoices provided by the Master show that a minimum of
$62,227.14 is due to Mr. Gilmer; (R.852)

•

The Master failed to explain why Mr. Failor purchases declines from an
average of at least 375,000 per month to 18,000 in N o v e m b e r 1996; (R. 856)

•

The Master failed to explain why there are wide variations in the products
coasted between the Mr. Failor and the Mr. Gilmer/Premium Plastics'
schedules; (R. 857)
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37.

•

The Master does not explain why the Mr. Failor and Mr. Gilmer schedules
were constructed differently, i.e. why they are not in the same format so that
numbers could be easily compared to check for accuracy; (R. 856-57)

•

The Master failed to explained how units coated could decline from 511,550
in April 1997 to 50,613 in May of 1997 and 44,505 in August 1997; (R. 857)

•

The Master failed to address, for example, inconsistencies in the report that
show that more products was coated than was sold (it is impossible to sell
units that don't exists). (R.857)
O n or about August 18, 2000, the Premium Plaintiffs filed its Objection to the

Final Report of the Special Master based on the master's failure to abide by the procedures
in the Order of Reference and the errors and inconsistencies in the Master's report as set
forth above. (R. 840-1109).
38.

O n or about October 31, 2007, based on the report of the Premium Plaintiffs'

forensic accountant, the Premium Plaintiffs filed Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum Re:
Plaintiffs' Objections to the Master's Report setting forth the following additional objections
to the Master's Report:
•

The Master did not compute the number of coated units by extrapolating
information from MegaDyne's coating reports. Rather, he relied upon a
schedule prepared for him by MegaDyne; (R. 6332) {see Affidavit and
Report of Derk Rasmussen, R. 2102)

•

The MegaDyne schedule relied upon by the Master was incomplete in that
it omitted 25 products; (R. 6332, 2102, 2114, 2115)

•

The Master only tested five lot numbers with records of coating processing
condition reports, all within the months of May and June 1996; (R. 6332,
2103)

•

The schedules relied upon by the Master did not include all the batches
coated; (R. 6332, 2103)
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•

N o all lots were included during the months of March through June of
1997 and there were at least three lots totaling over 800,000 unaccounted
for by the Master; (R. 6332, 2103)

•

Since not all of the coated products were included in MegaDyne's
schedule, none of the R O C P C reports were reviewed and not all lot
numbers were accounting meaning that Special Master could not have
calculated all of the products coated; (R. 6332-6333, 2103)

•

For the period of January 1997 through September 1997, the Master did
not independendy calculate the number of units coated, but simply
deferred to the quantities provided on the schedule prepared by
MegaDyne for the Master; (R. 6333, 2104)

•

For the coated products sold, the Master tested only 61 transactions out of
28,000 invoices; (R. 6333, 2105)

•

The Master did not perform any tests verifying that the information
contained in the invoices was complete; (R. 6333, 2105)

•

The Master failed to sufficiently document how he reached his
conclusions; (R. 6333, 2105)

•

The Master calculated a beginning inventory of 1,219,167 units as of
March 1, 1996 without any documented evidence supporting that figure.
Rather the Master simply backed into the n u m b e r by starting with the
September 30, 1197 inventory, added his calculation of sold units and
subtracted his calculations of units purchased. F o r the Master to be
correct, MegaDyne would have had to sell 1,072,782 units during January
to February 1996, something MegaDyne had never done; (R. 6333, 2106)

•

The Master did not reconcile the beginning inventory with the closest
known physical inventory of December 3 1 , 1995; (R. 6333, 2106)

•

The Master did not have all of the production reports and sales sub ledgers
did not match the production totals; (R. 6333, 2107)

•

In calculating the beginning inventory of 1,219,167, the Master overlooked
MegaDyne's documents showing a beginning inventory of only 60,000
units; (R. 6333)
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•

The errors in the Master's calculations results in underpayments to PPI
and Mr Gilmer of at least $69,550 00 and underpayment to Mr Failor of
$57,958 00, (R 6334)

•

Invoices from MegaDyne's ups and balls supplier, National Wire Services
show that PPI and Mr Gilmer were underpaid royalties of at least
$132,384 00, (R 6334)

•

Royalties calculated from the purchase of coating material demonstrate
that PPI and Mr Gilmer were underpaid by at least 1,400,797 00, (R
6334)

•

By analyzing business trends created by third party documents, P P F s
expert calculated that PPI and Mr Gilmer were underpaid at least
$877,067 00, (R 6334)

•

PPFs expert accountant examined documents from third parties and from
MegaDyne and concluded that based on vendor unit purchases only, PPI
and Mr Gilmer were underpaid at least $2,831,075 and by applying the
royalty trend analysis to the documents reviewed, P P I / M r Gilmer were
underpaid royalties b^ $2,411 ? 284, (R 6334)

•

Royalties calculated from vendor invoices show that Mr Failor was
underpaid at least $7,255 m 1997, (R 6335)

•

The Master did not examine the documents from coating material
suppbers If he had, he would have learned that from March 1996 through
April 1997, Mr Failor was underpaid by at least $440,000 00, (R 6335)

•

For the period from March 1996 through April 1997, the checks, coating
reports and matenal certifications show that the Master reached erroneous
conclusions regarding the number of units coated, l e , the Master found
that 4,747,425 units were coated when the documents show that between
4,854,984 and 4,912,864 were coated, (R 6335)

•

The Master incorrectly determined that Mr Failor earned royalties from
March 1996 through April 1997 of $237,371 25 when the documents show
that Mi Fallot actually earned royalties during that period from between
$262,422 25 to 264,432 35, (R 6336)

•

The Master never reconciled the difference between the electronic
download provided by MegaDyne reflecting spatula coating with
18

MegaDyne's spatula coating reports which resulted in an additional
$8,323.44 owed to PPI and Mr. Gilmer. (R. 6336)
Denial

of Jury
39.

Trial

On or about August 30, 2000, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike Jury

Demand and for Judgment on the Special Master's Final Report asserting that the Premium
Plaintiffs were not entided to a jury trial on the equitable accounting claim, that the case was
too complicated to be submitted to a jury, and requesting that the Court enter judgment
based solely on the Special Master's Report under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53. (R.
1135-37).
40.

In the Premium Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's

Motion to Strike Jury Demand and for Judgment on the Special Master's Report, the
Premium Plaintiffs asserted that they have never received an accurate accounting from
defendants or the Special Master in more than nine (9) years of litigation and that they did
not waive and are not precluded from having a jury trial on their legal claims. They also
asserted that under Rule 53, the Special Master's report may, at most, be submitted as
evidence by a jury. (R. 2374-76).
41.

Throughout the proceeding, MegaDyne persistently refused to produce

relevant documents as shown by the following:
•

October 1999: Order to Compel Production of Discovery; (R. 16334)

•

August 2000: MegaDyne's Motion for Protective Order; (R. 114852)

•

December 2000: PPI's Motions for Sanctions for Noncompliance
with Discovery; (R. 1364-98)
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•

December 2000: MegaDyne's Motion to Quash PPI's Subpoenas
Duces Tecum; (R. 1440-42)

•

June 2001: Order Requiring MegaDyne's to Allow PPI to Review
all Documentation Made Available to Special Master and Other
Discovery Requests; (R. 1949)

•

July 2001- Protective Order issued; (R. 1973-78)

•

August 2001: Stipulation and Order re: PPI's Access to Master's
Documents; (R. 1979-81)

•

October 2001: PPI's Motion to Compel D o c u m e n t Production and
Third Document Production Request; (R. 1996-98)

•

November 2001: MegaDyne's Motion for Protective Order; (R.
2266-71).

•

February 2002: Order Granting PPI's Access to Some Requested
Documents and Granting MegaDyne's Motion for Protective
Order on Others. Deferred evidentiary hearing on whether special
master exceeded the order of reference; (R. 2410-11)

•

August 2002: PPI's Motion for Sanctions for Discovery
Noncompliance; (R. 2606-2959)

•

September 2002: Order Deferring Sanctions and Granting PPI's
Discovery; (R. 3001-05)

•

April 2003: PPI's Motion to Compel Discovery or Rule 37
sanctions; (R. 3110-3188)

•

July 2003: Order Compelling Discovery; (R. 3466-68)

•

May 2004: MegaDyne's Motion for Protective Order Denying
Discovery; (R. 4400-07)

•

September 2004: Bench Ruling ordering MegaDyne's to produce
400 sample invoices; (R. 4656)

•

September 2005: Order compelling production of 400 sample
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invoices; (R. 4724-27)
•

42.

August 2007: Parties reached stipulation to access certain sealed
documents from MegaDyne's Aspen Labs litigation in federal court.
(R. 6304)
After MegaDyne repeatedly stonewalled discovery, as set forth above, the

Premium Plaintiffs succeeded in subpoenaing documents from out-of-state third party
suppliers and sources. 4 The Premium Plaintiffs also obtained patent litigation information in
a hearing in federal court on August 10, 2007, after MegaDyne refused to supply the
information. (R. 6535).
Denial of Motion
43.

to

Amend

In the documents obtained by the Premium Plaintiffs in the federal court, the

Premium Plaintiffs discovered that MegaDyne licensed the coating of medical products and
provided P P P s trade secrets to third parties. (R. 6534).
44.

MegaDyne has successfully prosecuted patent litigation, including but n o t

limited to the following: MegaDyne v. Aaron Med. Industries, case no: 2:96CV0233 U C (1998);
MegaDyne v. American Catheter, case no: 2:97XC0166 D A K (1998); MegaDyne v. DeRoyal
Industries et al, case no: 2:00CV00267 T C (1999); MegaDyne v. Olsen Electrical Medical, case no:
2:91CV00019 BST (1993); MegaDyne v. Saron, case no: 2:97CV00228 T C (1997); MegaDyne v.
Triad MedicalTech et al, case no: 2:00CV00548-18 (2003); MegaDyne v. UniMed Medical Products,
case no: 2:01CV0021 D A K (2001); and MegaDyne Medical Products Inc. v. Aspen Labs Jncy case
no: 2 : 9 1 C V 0 0 8 5 2 V S J ( 1 9 9 1 ) ^

(R. 6534-35).

4

The Premium Plaintiffs requested this information from defendants on several occasions
during the litigation, including in Plaintiffs Second Request for Production of D o c u m e n t s
filed on June 28, 2000, and in a Motion to Compel filed October 17, 2001. (R. 2217-2256).
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45.

Mr. Failor and Mr. Gilmer provided supporting testimony and disclosed their

trade secrets in the Aspen Labs litigation to enable MegaDyne to prevail. The documents
obtained from third parties and the information provided by Mr. Gilmer and Mr. Failor in
the Aspen Labs litigation was subsequently used by MegaDyne to prevail in the other cases
specified above. (R. 6535).
46.

As a result, MegaDyne received compensation from some or all the

defendants named above based on a formula of a fixed amount per coated unit
manufactured or sold by the foregoing defendants a n d / o r gross sales, or other as yet
undisclosed formulas. (R. 6535).
47.

Throughout the parties' relationship, the Premium Plaintiffs and MegaDyne

were bound by confidentiality agreements and duties of good faith and fair dealing.
However, as a result of the Aspen Labs litigation, PPI, Mr. Gilmer and Mr. Failor was
induced to disclose trade secrets that were not obligated under contract, but which were
used to the monetary benefit of MegaDyne's and for which the Premium Plaintiffs received
no compensation. (R. 6535).
48.

MegaDyne did not pay any of the proceeds received from the patent litigation

to the Premium Plaintiffs or compensate the Premium Plaintiffs for units unlawfully coated
by the third party defendants or for units designated by MegaDyne with the foregoing
defendants. (R. 6535).
49.

O n or about Decemb.er 5, 2007, the Premium Plaintiffs filed a Motion for

Leave to File an Amended Consolidated Complaint requesting that it be permitted to file an
amended complaint to assure that all issues were fully and properly litigated in one forum
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and to include claims based on the information and documents that had been received by
the Premium Plaintiffs regarding the patent litigation in which defendants were involved.
(R.6586-89).
50.

The Premium Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint was

filed prior to the deadline for the amendment of pleadings. (R. 6318-23; 6586-89).
51.

On March 6, 2008, the district court held a hearing on each of the above-

referenced motions. The Order from the hearing provides:
1.
This case involves an accounting issue. The parties
previously agreed that a special master was to be appointed and
present his report to the Court. Accounting is an equitable
remedy and the Plaintiffs are not entided to a jury on the issue.
Defendant's motion to strike the jury demand is granted.
2.
Plaintiffs [sic] objections to the method of assembling
the report of the Special Master are noted. The Court has
previously rejected the Plaintiffs [sic] objections as they relate
to the Special Master's exceeding the scope of the Order of
Reference, contact with the parties, the filing of a work plan and
the method of obtaining documents from the Defendants. The
Court, once again, denies these objections.
3.
Plaintiffs [sic] request to depose the Special Master has
previously been denied. The Plaintiff has presented no new
grounds for the Court to revisit this denial. Plaintiffs Motion
to Depose the Special Master is denied.
4.
Plaintiffs [sic] Motion for a Hearing on the Report of
the Special Master. The Utah R. Civ. P. 53 provides that the
Court is to accept the Report of the Special Master's finding of
fact unless clearly erroneous. An objection to the report has
been made accompanied by a request for a hearing. Based upon
the allegations of error coupled with a report from the
Plaintiffs [sic] expert, the Court determines that it is proper to
grant the Plaintiffs [sic] request for a hearing on the Report of
the Special Master. The Court has some concerns about the
scope of such a hearing. Therefore, it directs that the parties
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meet, agree to a proposed format and consult with the Court to
finalize the procedures to be followed.
5.
Plaintiffs [sic] Motion to file an Amended Complaint is
denied. This case is ten years old. The new issues raised by the
Amended Complaint cannot be addressed in an accounting
issue case. If the Plaintiffs [sic] desire to raise these new issues,
they will have to do it in a separate action.
(R. 6703-04).
IV
SUMMARY OF A R G U M E N T S
Unquestionably, the lower court committed reversible error in striking the Premium
Plaintiffs demand for a jury trial. Their right to a jury trial is protected by Article I, Section
10 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. § 78-21-1 and Rules 38 and 53 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, simply because a party pleads both legal and equitable
claims, is no justification for denying a jury trial. Instead, the jury decides the facts on the
legal claims first.
Finally the appointment of a Special Master, does not deprive a litigant of a jury trial.
The Master's report is simply given to the jury as evidence. Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The lower court also clearly erred in not rejecting the Master's report. There is n o
question the Master repeatedly violated the Order of Reference, engaged in unfair ex parte
process, and came up with an internally, inconsistent and impossible report. Both the
process used by the Master and the substance of the report itself dictates a rejection of the
Master's report.
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Lastly, the Premium Plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their Complaint. The
Complaint is based on facts recendy discovered after MegaDyne stonewalled discovery.
Also, judicial economy and the lack of procedure to MegaDyne suggests a reversal of the
lower court on this issue.
V,
ARGUMENT
I.

T H E DISTRICT COURT ERRED I N D E N Y I N G T H E PREMIUM
PLAINTIFFS' D E M A N D FOR A JURY TRIAL A N D REJECTING
T H E PREMIUM PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS T O T H E MASTER'S
REPORT

The district court erred in granting MegaDyne's request to strike the Premium
Plaintiffs' jury demand and in rejecting their objections to the report of the special master.
The court should have allowed the Premium Plaintiffs to proceed to trial to present all
evidence regarding their objections to the special master's report and allowing the jury to be
the final arbiter of the case. The trial court's ruling should accordingly be reversed and the
case remanded with an instruction that the Premium Plaintiffs are entided to proceed to trial.
Along with their equitable claim for an accounting, the Premium Plaintiffs initiated
this action by asserting contract and tort claims in the Complaint and properly demanded a
jury trial. Constitutional, statutory and common law entides the Premium Plaintiffs to a jury
trial of its contract and tort claims in this case.
The United States Constitution guarantees that "[i]n [s]uits at common law, where the
value in controversy shaD exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."
United States Constitution, 7th Amend. The Utah Constitution similarly guarantees the right
to a jury trial in civil cases. Utah Const. Art. I Sec. 10. So do Utah Statutes and Rule.
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-21-1 provides:
Right to jury trial.
In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal property,
with or without money damages, or for money claimed as due
upon contract or as damages for breach of contract, or for
injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jury, unless a jury is
waived or a reference is ordered.
Id.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 38 provides:
Rule 38. Jury trial of right.
(c) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by
The constitution or as given by statute shall be preserved
to the parties.
(d) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue
triable of right by a jury by paying the statutory fee and
serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing
at any time after the commencement of the action and not
later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading
directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed
upon a pleading of the party.
Id.

A.

T h e Premium Plaintiffs Assertion in the Complaint of B o t h L e g a l
and Equitable Claims D o e s N o t Deprive T h e m of a Jury Trial

Historically, a distinction was made between cases involving equitable claims in which
a party is not entided to a jury trial and cases involving legal claims where a party is entided
to a jury trial:
In an action where a single claim is presented and a single remedy
demanded, the action can rationally be classified as one which
historically would have been either legal or equitable. In such a case,
the proper approach to deciding whether a claiming has a right to a
26
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jury trial is whether the action is legal' or 'equitable 5 . Similarly, where
the case presents several claims or demands more than one remedy . . .
the matter is not more difficult than simply suit if the claims, or the
remedies, are either all legal or all equitable. Thus, where the case
presents several claims or demands more than one remedy, the most
direct test is whether the action now pending before the District Court
contains legal issues.
Swoffordv. B<&W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 409 (5 th Cir. 1964) (plaintiff entitled to jury trial where
equitable claim for accounting and legal claim for damages asserted). However,
in a series of cases starting about 40 years ago, the Supreme Court
changed the focus to some extent. When a proceeding involves a
mixture of legal and equitable claims, the question is not the character
of the entire proceeding as legal or equitable, but the character of
particular issues as legal or equitable.
Bandy v. Bandy, 237 B.R. 661, 664 (U.S. Bk. E.D. Tenn. 1999). As stated by the Utah
Supreme Court:
It has long since been held that under our system a legal and
equitable remedy may be sought in the same action; but each
remedy must be governed by the same law that would apply to
it if the other remedy had not also been asked for. A n action to
recover damages . . . is as clearly a legal remedy as any that could
be named, and it is an action in which a party cannot be
deprived of a jury trial.
Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 225 P.2d 739, 744 (Utah 1950); see also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S.
531, 537-38 (1970) ("where equitable and legal claims are joined in the same action, there is a
right to a jury trial on the legal claims which must not be infringed either by trying the legal
issues as incidental to the equitable ones or by a court trial of a c o m m o n issue existing
between the claims Jurisdictions throughout the United States agree/'). Jurisdictions
throughout the United States have followed this doctrine. See Walker v. Jones, 693 F. Supp.
1202,1203 (Dist. D.C. (1988); University of the Virgin Islands v. Springer, 232 F.Supp.2d 462, 471
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(D. Virgin Islands 2002); EEOC v. Cony)amestown Corp., 719 F.2d 1219, 1224 (3' d Cir. 1983)
("It is well established that joint of legal and equitable claims does not result in the waiver of
a right to a jury trial on the legal claims. 7 '); Bandy, 237 B.R. 661 at 664 ("court cannot deny a
jury trial of the legal issues on the ground that they are incidental to the equitable issues").
Utah courts have also long adhered to the well-established rule that a party does not
waive its right to a jury trial by asserting both legal and equitable claims. "Where the issues
are legal issues, the fact that equitable relief may be prayed for, to carry into effect the
judgments based upon the legal issues, is not sufficient to deprive either party of his rights to
have the legal issues submitted to a jury." Petty v. Clark, 129 P.2d 568, 590 (Utah 1942). As
stated by the Utah Supreme Court:
The right of trial by jury is a constitutional right, and every
litigant, in an action of legal cognizance, has an absolute right to
that method of trial, a right which the court may not disregard. .
. . The question therefore is: Are legal or equitable principles to
be applied? If the principles to which appeal must be had are
principles of law in the main or primary action, either party
thereto upon demand is entitled to a trial by jury. This is true,
although in the action application is made to the court to
exercise its equity powers in granting injunctive relief. Where
the issues are legal issues, the fact that equitable relief may be
prayed for, to carry into effect the judgments based upon the
legal issues, is not sufficient to deprive either party of his rights
to have the legal issues submitted to a jury.
Norback v. Bd. of Directors, 37 P.2d 339, 341-43 (Utah 1934) (internal citations and quotations
omitted) (emphasis added).
According to the allegations of his complaint, plaintiff had two
rights of action and was entitled to two remedies, of which he
might pursue either or both at his election, the legal remedy of
damages . . . and [an] equitable remedy. . . . Under those
circumstances it will be conceded that the plaintiff would have
been entitled as of right to a trial by jury of the legal issues as to
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damages. Instead of doing this, he accepted the invitation held
out to him by our laws and joined his two actions in one. H e
should not be held to have thereby forfeited his right to a jury
trial of the legal issues . . . .
Valley Mortuary, 225 P.2d at 744; Zions First NafI Bank v. Rocky Mtn. Irrigation, 795 P.2d 658,
662 (Utah 1990) ("when legal and equitable issues turn on the same operative facts, a jury
must decide the legal issue first; the jury's factual determination binds the trial court in its
determination of the parallel equitable issue").
The fact that the Premium Plaintiffs asserted both legal and equitable claims in this
case does not preclude a jury trial. Utah law is clear that a party may plead alternative claims
in a complaint without waiving their right to a jury trial.
Where a party seeks an accounting, "[t]he fact t h a t . . . equitable relief in the form of
an accounting is [also] sought does not in and of itself preclude a right to a jury trial, as it has
been declared that the right to a trial by jury does not depend u p o n the choice of words used
in pleadings." Bruce v. Bohanony 436 F.2d 733, 736 (10th O r . 1970); see also, Koch v. Koch, 203
F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2002) (trial on accounting claim); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469,
479 (1962) (where both legal and equitable claims exist, a jury may, with proper legal
instructions, "readily determine the recovery, if any, to be had . . . whether the theory finally
settled upon is that of breach of contract," an equitable claim or any combination thereof.).
The trial court's denial of the Premium Plaintiffs' demand for a jury trial on the basis
that this case involves an accounting was clearly erroneous and should be reversed.
B.

T h e Appointment of a Special Master Cannot Deprive the
P r e m i u m Plaintiffs of their Right to a Jury Trial
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53 (e)(3), which governs the appointment of a special
master in jury trials provides:
Injury actions. In an action to be tried by a jury the master shall
not be directed to report the evidence. His finding upon the
issues submitted to him are admissible as evidence of the
matters found and may be read to the jury, subject to the ruling
of the court upon any objections in point of law which may be
made to the report.
Id.
The purpose of the appointment of a special master:
primarily ought to include findings of fact going to the ultimate issues
of the case rather than analysis of the evidence yielding the special
master's conclusions. Legal analysis in a case where there is a jury
demand is appropriate only to the extent that they provide a proper
context for the special master's findings of fact.
Miller v. Bank South Corp., 173 F.R.D. 543, 545 (N.D. Ga. 1997). In complicated cases
involving an accounting, a special master's report "can help jurors organize and assess
complicated issues [and a] master's findings [may] reduce the complexity of [an] accounting
to a manageable level" but cannot remove the case from the jury. Music Suppliers, Inc. v.
London Records, Inc., 1988 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3475, 6-7 (D. Mass 1988). "In a jury action, a
master's finding is not a final determination." Id. at 9. Issues presented to a special master
are:
referred merely for purposes of clarification before presentation to the
jury which remains the ultimate arbiter of the facts. The admission of
the master's report does not prevent the parties from introducing
evidence that conflicts with the master's findings, or calling witnesses
w h o have testified before the master; the report of the master is merely
prima facie evidence which the parties may attack at the trial with any
competent evidence and which the jury is free to disregard.
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Id. at 9-10. see also Jackson v. Local Union 542, 155 F. Supp. 2d 332, 338 (E.D. Penn. 2001);
Eastern Fireproofing Co., Inc. v. United States Gypsum Co., 50 F.R.D. 140, 142 (D. Mass 1970).
Although the appointment of a special master is meant to simplify complex issues,
the parties and the court are not bound by a special master's conclusions. Once a special
master has prepared a report under Rule 53, any "party who so desires is doubtless free to
put before the jury any competent evidence are variance with the Master's conclusions."
Connecticut Importing Co. v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 225, 227 (D. Conn. 1940); L.K.
Comstock & Co., Inc. v. Becon Const. Co., Inc. 932 F. Supp. 906, 909-10 (either party may present
evidence contradicting special master's report and jury need not accept special master's
findings). Even where parties have agreed to and tried an entire case before a special master,
the right to a jury trial is nonetheless preserved. Music Suppliers, Inc., 1988 U.S. Dist. L E X I S
3475 at 3-7. As explained by one court:
The reference to a special master in no way infringes [a party's]
constitutional rights to a trial by jury. This reference is preliminarily to
a jury trial and is designed and calculated to simplify, shorten and
facilitate that trial. . . . [A] report by a special master, distilling the mass
of facts involved, will certainly aid a correct disposition of the case. It
is not necessary that the order of reference reserve the parties' right to
a jury trial because rule 53 (e)(3) itself makes that reservation. . . .
Instead of denying or impinging upon a trial by jury this reference to a
master should provide a more scientific and better jury trial.
Wirt^v. Bunch, 1841 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7210, 4 (M.D. Ga.,1963).
A party that voluntarily agrees to the appointment of a special master and participates
in the special master proceedings does not waive a jury demand. Evans v. Boyd Restaurant
Group, 240 Fed. Appx. 393, 398 (11 t h O r . 2007). A court commits reversible error by
adopting a recommendation and report of a special master and denying a jury trial where one
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has been properly requested by the plaintiff. Id. at 397. As explained by the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals:
Litigants are entitled to a trial by the court, in every suit, save
where exceptional circumstances are shown. That the case
involves complex issues of fact and law is no justification for
reference to a Master, but rather is an impelling reason for a
trial before an experienced judge. . . . [T]he Master's report in a
jury case is merely evidence which a jury may disregard.
Polin v. Dun <&Bradstreet, Inc., 634 F.2d 1319 (10th O r . 1980)(emphasis added). In Henry A.
Knott Co. v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of West Va., 772 F.2d 78, (4th Cir. 1985), the
court noted:
The use of a master does n o t ^ r ^ violate the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial; but, if the master makes
no factual findings or his findings are unclear, the parties
must be able to present their case to the jury.
Id at n.5; see also DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1364 (Utah 1994) (emphasis added)
(jury trial held where parties stipulated to appointment of special master); Sutton v. Johnson
Cotton Co., 114 F.2d 302 (4 th Cir. 1940) (master's report may be submitted to jury, but jury
makes final determinations on issues of fact); Connecticut Importing Co. v. Frankfort Distilleries,
Inc., 42 F. Supp. 225, 227 (D. Conn. 1940) ("Any party w h o so desires is doubtless free to
put before the jury any competent evidence at variance with the Master's conclusions and to
submit any resulting conflict to the jury.").
In this case, the Premium Plaintiffs properly requested and is entitled to a jury trial on
the legal claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
and misrepresentation/non-disclosure. In addition, the Premium Plaintiffs are entitled to a
jury trial on the unjust enrichment claim. See e.g., Kurth v. Wiarda, 1999 U T 335 \ 4, 991 P.2d
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1113; Pacific Chromalox Division v. Irey, 787 P.2d 1319, 1320 (Utah App. 1990). Only the claim
for an accounting is not subject to the right of a trial by jury.
The district court failed to even acknowledge the Premium Plaintiffs' legal and
equitable claims and appears to have simply ignored all claims except the accounting claim in
ruling that they had no right to a jury trial. Moreover, although the court granted the
Premium Plaintiffs' request for a hearing on the report of the Special Master, the court
erroneously applied the standard in Rule 53 applicable to non-jury actions which provides that
a court may adopt, modify or reject the report of a special master after receiving objections
to the report from the parties. See Utah R. Civ. P. 53 (e)(2).
II.

T H E TRIAL COURT E R R E D I N REJECTING T H E P R E M I U M
PLAINTIFFS5 OBJECTIONS T O T H E R E P O R T OF T H E SPECIAL
MASTER

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 53 (c) provides:
The order of reference to the may specify or limit his powers
and may direct him to report only upon particular issues or to
do or perform particular acts or to receive and report evidence
only and may fix the time and place for beginning and closing
the hearings and for the filing of the master's report.

Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 742 (Utah 1990); Ferguson Contracting Co. v. Manhattan Trust Co.,
118 F. 791, 794 (6 th Cir 1902) (order of reference is both "the chart and limitation of the
Master's authority"); U.S. v. IBM Corp., 66 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N. Y. 1974) (|T]he power of a
special master is completely dependent upon the Order of Reference").
In this case, the Order of Reference included specific procedural requirements,
including the establishment and compliance with a work plan, the compliance with certain
deadlines, a prohibition against improper ex parte communications and the submission of a
33
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report with all evidence supporting the master's findings in the report. The Master failed to
comply with any of these mandates in the Order of Reference. The master instead refused
to establish a work plan and in essence, determined that he had the discretion to carry out
certain tasks or not at he saw fit. The Master failed to comply with deadlines in the Order of
Reference, failed to conduct discovery, including serving requests for production of
documents to the parties or issuing any document subpoenas and failed to submit any
documents, evidence or testimony supporting his report as required by the Order of
Reference. The master also engaged in improper ex parte communications with MegaDyne
in reviewing and discussing MegaDyne's documents at MegaDyne's facility and requesting
that MegaDyne prepare a schedule regarding the products coated and sold. Rather than
conducting a thorough examination of the voluminous documents relevant to the issue of
the amount of products coated and sold, the master instead simply asked MegaDyne for its
calculations and then simply minimally sampled those figures against invoices provided by
MegaDyne. The Master also failed to comply with the Order of Reference by failing to
submit with his report any evidence, testimony of documents relied upon in reaching the
findings in his report.
The substantive purpose of the order of Reference was limited to the determination
of the amount of product coated and sold. The order did not authorize the master to
conduct an accounting or to calculate any damages or amounts owed to either party. The
master nonetheless exceeded his authority in the Order of Reference by calculating amounts
owed to the parties and conducting his version of an inaccurate and incomplete accounting
of amounts owed based on products sold and coated. The conclusions reached by the
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Master, in any event, were inaccurate and inconsistent as the Master failed to consider all
relevant documentation and failed to properly calculate products coated, products sold and
amounts owed based on those figures.
Despite the master's utter failure to comply with any of the procedural requirements
of the Order of Reference and his failure to accomplish the only objective of his
appointment—calculating the number of products coated and sold—the trial court
nonetheless rejected the Premium Plaintiffs' objections to the Master's report.
In the Order denying the Premium Plaintiffs' objections to the report of the special
master, the trial court improperly references the clearly erroneous standard found in Rule 53
(e) (2) which is applicable only to special master's findings in non-jury actions. In jury,
actions, a court is not bound to accept the report of the special master unless clearly
erroneous. Rather, as explained above, the special master's findings are merely evidence to
be submitted to the jury at trial Thus, instead of rejecting the Premium Plaintiffs' objections
to the special master's report, the court should have ordered the special master to comply
with the requirements of the Order of Reference and should have allowed the Premium
Plaintiffs to proceed to trial to challenge the findings of the special master as it would any
other evidence presented at trial. The trial court's rejection of the Premium Plaintiffs'
objections to the Master's report was accordingly erroneous and should be reversed by the
this and remanded to the trial court for a trial on all issues, including the findings in the
Master's report.
III.

T H E TRIAL COURT E R R E D I N D E N Y I N G T H E P R E M I U M
PLAINTIFFS' M O T I O N T O FILE A N A M E N D E D C O M P L A I N T
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (a) provides that a party may amend a pleading after
a responsive pleading has been filed only upon leave of the court and "leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). "P]t is well established that rule 15
should be interpreted liberally so as to allow parties to have their claims fully adjudicated."
Jones p. Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 U T A p p 355 ^ 16, 78 P.3d 988 (internal quotations
omitted).

"(T]he Court's ultimate goal in deciding a motion to amend is to have the real

controversy between the parties presented, their rights determined, and the cause decided . .
.."

Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 U T 102 ^9, 104 P.3d 1242 (internal quotations and

citations omitted).
In Utah courts, "the motion to amend analysis is . . . a multi-factored, flexible inquiry
that

allows trial courts the leeway to evaluate the factual

circumstances

and

legal

developments in each particular case." Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 U T A p p . 44, ^]
41, 87 P.3d 734.

However, there are three factors that courts generally consider when

determining whether to grant a motion for leave to amend: "the timeliness of the motion;
the justification given by the movant for the delay; and the resulting prejudice to the
responding party." Id. T] 26. Here, each of these three factors weighs decisively in favor of
granting the Premium Plaintiffs leave to amend, and the trial court erred when it denied the
Premium Plaintiffs leave to amend its Complaint on the grounds that "[t]his case is ten years
old" and that "[t]he new issues raised by the Amended Complaint cannot be addressed in an
accounting issue case." (R. 6704-05).
A.

T h e Premium Plaintiffs' Motion to A m e n d W a s T i m e l y F i l e d
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First, the Premium Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend was timely. Explaining this factor,
Utah courts have noted that '"motions to amend are typicaUy untimely when they are filed in
the advanced procedural stages of the litigation p r o c e s s / " Swan Creek VilL Homeowners A.ss'n
v. Warne, 2006 U T 22,1J20, 134 P.3d 1122.
Although the initial complaint in this case was filed ten years ago, discovery was not
completed, n o summary judgment has been issued, and no trial date has been set. E v e n
more importantly, the Premium Plaintiffs sought leave to amend its Complaint prior to the
deadline for the amendment of pleadings. Thus, the Premium Plaintiffs' Motion to A m e n d
was not untimely.
The Premium Plaintiffs recognizes that this Court has stated: "[Rjegardless of the
procedural posture of the case, motions to amend have typically been deemed untimely
when they were filed several years into the litigation." Kelly, 2004 U T A p p . at ^30. T h e
Court's rationale for this secondary part of the analysis was explained as follows:
In such cases, the ongoing passage of time makes it increasingly
difficult for the nonmoving party to effectively respond to the new
allegations or claims. Parties in such circumstances are often hindered
by witnesses who have since moved or died, by their shaky memories
and recollections, or by documents which have since been lost or
destroyed.
Id at ^j31. T h e Premium Plaintiffs submits that this case is not typical in this regard, and
justifies an exception from this general consideration for several reasons.
First, the Premium Plaintiffs' Amended Consolidated Complaint arises from the same
set of facts and under the same contracts that are central to the pending litigation. Indeed,
the additional claims under the Amended Consolidated Complaint relate back to the
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contractual relationships between the parties that are already at issue. As such, issues related
to the passage of time should not bar the Premium Plaintiffs' new claims.
Second, the new related claims should have been admitted into this case in the
interests of judicial efficiency and economy. The number of contracts at issue, the
understanding of the patent and technology issues, the conduct between the parties, and the
voluminous number of records applicable to the claims should only be dealt with by one
court and one jury. If the Premium Plaintiffs are forced to bring a new suit, then another
court will have to revisit these same issues that have taken so long to determine in this
proceeding, which would squander valuable judicial resources.
Third, justice requires the amendment of the Premium Plaintiffs' Complaint. D u e to
the physical limitations of the parties involved, the Court's decision denying the Premium
Plaintiffs leave to amend its Complaint virtually assures that the new claims will never be
brought. The primary Plaintiff, Mr. Mr. Gilmer, died in 2006 at the age of 87, and his widow
is in n o position to bring the newly discovered related claims in new litigation. In a very real
sense, the trial court's denial of the right to amend the consolidated complaint amounts to
summary judgment against the Premium Plaintiffs on its related claims.
Finally, the trial court erred when it characterized this action as one for an equitable
accounting in denying the Premium Plaintiffs leave to amend. As previously set forth, a
number of claims are at issue in this proceeding in addition to the Premium Plaintiffs'
request for an accounting. Consequently, the Premium Plaintiffs' new claims should not be
barred because they exceed the request for an accounting.
B.

T h e Premium Plaintiffs D i d N o t Delay in R e q u e s t i n g
Leave to File an A m e n d e d Complaint
38
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In considering whether to grant a motion to amend, the court must also look to the
reason offered for the delay in seeking to amend the pleading. This factor focuses on
"whether the moving party had knowledge of the events that are
sought to be added." Utah courts have generally adopted the United
States Supreme Court's narrow rule focusing on whether the motion to
amend was filed as the result of a dilatory motive, bad faith, or
unreasonable neglect on the part of the movant. While the
requirements for finding a dilatory motive, bad faith, or unreasonable
neglect have not been expressly defined, the Utah Court of Appeals
has correctly noted that "where the party's prior knowledge was
minimal, or where it was instead based on suspicious or inconclusive
evidence, the party's decision to hold off on pleading those allegations
until reliable confirmation could be obtained should not serve as
grounds for procedural default."
Swan Creek Vill. Homeowners Ass'n, 2006 U T 22, ^22.
For the past eight years, MegaDyne has persistently avoided the production of
relevant documents. The following establish the Premium Plaintiffs' diligent efforts from
1999 through 2007 to obtain the document relevant to its claims.
•

October 1999: Order to Compel Production of Discovery; (R. 16334)

•

August 2000: MegaDyne's Motion for Protective Order; (R. 114852)

•

December 2000: the Premium Plaintiffs' Motions for Sanctions for
Noncompliance with Discovery; (R. 1364-98)

•

December 2000: MegaDyne's Motion to Quash the Premium
Plaintiffs' Subpoenas Duces Tecum; (R. 1440-42)

•

June 2001: Order Requiring MegaDyne's to Allow the Premium
Plaintiffs to Review all Documentation Made Available to Special
Master and Other Discovery Requests; (R. 1949)

•

July 2001- Protective Order issued; (R. 1973-78)
39
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•

August 2001: Stipulation and Order re: the Premium Plaintiffs'
Access to Master's Documents; (R. 1979-81)

•

October 2001: the Premium Plaintiffs' Motion t o Compel
Document Production and Third Document Production Request;
(R. 1996-98)

•

November 2001: MegaDyne's Motion for Protective Order; (R.
2266-71).

•

February 2002: Order Granting the Premium Plaintiffs' Access to
Some Requested Documents and Granting MegaDyne's Motion for
Protective Order on Others. Deferred evidentiary hearing on
whether special master exceeded the order of reference; (R. 241011)

•

August 2002: the Premium Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions for
Discovery Noncompliance; (R. 2606-2959)

-

oCptciiiLycr ^\J\JZS. v^ruer j^eiernng oanctions anu ^ r a n t i n g toe
Premium Plaintiffs' Discovery; (R. 3001-05)

•

April 2003: the Premium Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery
or Rule 37 sanctions; (R. 3110-3188)

•

July 2003: Order Compelling Discovery; (R. 3466-68)

•

May 2004: MegaDyne's Motion for Protective Order Denying
Discovery; (R. 4400-07)

•

September 2004: Bench Ruling ordering MegaDyne's to produce
400 sample invoices; (R. 4656)

•

September 2005: Order compelling production of 400 sample
invoices; (R. 4724-27)

•

August 2007: Parties reached stipulation to access certain sealed
documents from MegaDyne's Aspen Labs litigation in federal court.
(R. 6304)
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The Premium Plaintiffs were unaware of its new claims until it received the
documents that it had been seeking for eight years. The above-listed events clearly
demonstrate that any delay in this case was due to MegaDyne's refusal to cooperate in
discovery. Had MegaDyne produced the records initially sought by the Premium Plaintiffs,
they would have become aware of its additional claims and been able to assert its new claims
much earlier.
Secondly, progress was hindered by the sheer complexity of evaluating the
documents that the Premium Plaintiffs eventually obtained. N o single source of documents
was complete enough to establish the royalties due for the contract years. Determining the
scope of damages required assembling and coordinating data from literally thousands of
individual records produced from various sources and having accountants generate
calculations from the data thus collated. The quantity of royalty units ultimately compiled
from discovered sets of documents of individual sales and shipments of coated units
numbered over 50,000,000. N o t until these tasks were completed did the full extent of the
Premium Plaintiffs' underpaid royalties become apparent.
C.

M e g a D y n e Will N o t B e Unduly Prejudiced If the P r e m i u m
Plaintiffs Are Permitted T o A m e n d e d Their Complaint

The question of prejudice arising from failure to provide timely notice is generally a
question of fact, as the Utah Supreme Court has explained:
In deciding on a motion to amend, the trial court should primarily
consider whether granting the motion would subject the opposing
party to unavoidable prejudice "by having an issue adjudicated for
which he had not had time to prepare.". . . . Where the amendment
would advance a new theory of recovery based almost entirely on facts
already in evidence, the court should liberally allow amendment
because the opposing party is then generally prepared to address such a
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claim. Aurora Credit Svcs. Inc. v. Liberty West DeveL 970 P.2d 1273, 1282
(Utah 1998).
This Court has expounded the prejudice rule more fully, as follows.
[A] showing of simple prejudice is not enough to support a denial of a
motion to amend.. . . [I]n order to justify the denial of a motion to
amend on prejudice grounds, the prejudice "must be undue or
substantia] prejudice, since almost every amendment of a pleading will
result in some 'practical prejudice' to the opposing party."
Kelly 2004 U T App. at ^|31 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The trial court denied the Premium Plaintiffs' motion to file an amended complaint
that it filed prior to the deadline for the amendment of pleadings, based on the court's
conclusion that this case is ten (10) years old and presendy solely an accounting case. As
explained above, this case, while including a claim for accounting, also involves claims for
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and misrepresentation. The trial court failed to
consider the Premium Plaintiffs' existing legal claims in this action, the deadline for
amendment of pleadings or any of the factors relevant to a determination as to the requested
amendment. For example, the trial did not consider the fact that the new claim for violation
of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act in the Amended Complaint are based on
information recently obtained by the Premium Plaintiffs from a third party subpoena after
Defendants refused to produce the information to the Premium Plaintiffs.
Under Rule 15, a party should be permitted to amend a complaint based on newly
discovered evidence and under the multi-factored test set forth above. Accordingly, the trial
court erred when it denied the Premium Plaintiffs leave to amend its Complaint to allow for
full and fair litigation of the entire controversy between the parties.
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CONCLUSION
The Lower Court misapplied Rule 53 when it struck the Premium Plaintiffs jury
demand. Pleading legal and alternatively legal claims in the same Complaint does not justify
eliminating the right to a jury trial. The inherent impossibility of the Master's report coupled
with the Master's repeated failure to abide by the Order of Reference requires the rejection
of his report. Lastly, the lower court did not apply the correct criteria in declining the
Motion to Amend the Complaint.
For these compelling reasons, the Master's report should be rejected, the demand for
jury trial reinstated, and the Order denying the Motion to Amend reversed.
DATED this 1ST day of December, 2008.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY

.. AtrJU,
Dale F. Gardiner
Scott M. Lilja
Cassie J. Medura
Lisa B. Bohman
Attorneys for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the within and foregoing
document to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 1st day of December, 2008, to the following:
George M. Haley
David R. Parkinson
j . Andrew Sjoblom
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN
299 South Mam Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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DaleF. Gardiner, #1147
Mark C. Quinn, #6782
O'RORKE & GARDINER, LLC
6965 Union Park Center, Suite 450
Midvale, Utah 84047-6045

FILED DISTRICT COURT

Telephone:
Facsimile:

By.

(801)569-3131
(801)569-3434

Third ''•--''•--'^.-.irict

m 1 2 1999
SAL1 LAKHltLoisi Y
7U

| Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KENNETH L. FAILOR; and PREMIUM
PLASTICS, INC., a California Corporation;
HARVEY VAN EPPS GILMER, JR.,

ORDER OF REFERENCE

Plaintiffs,
v.
MEGADYNE MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC.,
a Utah Corporation, f.k.a. American Medical
Products, Inc.

Civil No.: 980907641
Judge: William A. Thorne

Defendant.

Pursuant to Rule 53, Utah R. Civ. P., Plaintiffs' motion to appoint a national accounting
firm to serve as a special master in this action, the Consent of Defendant, and good cause
appearing therefor, accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Appointment. John W. Curran, of Ernst & Young, LLP, 60 East South Temple,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, shall serve as special master in this action until further

order of the Court. The special master will submit an Affidavit of Impartiality
certifying that he has not previously worked for, and has no reason to be partial
towards, any party or attorney in this action.
2.

Compensation. The compensation to be paid to the special master shall be
approved by the Court based upon a rate of $300.00 per hour for Mr. Curran and
other partners of Ernst & Young, $200.00 per hour for mid-level assistants and
$125.00 per hour for other assistants, plus reasonable expenses incurred in
performing the master's duties. Because Mr. Curran is located primarily in the
Seattle office of Ernst & Young, it is anticipated that he will be required to travel to
Salt Lake City on occasion. The expenses of such travel will be absorbed by Ernst
& Y'oung for six to eight trips during the course of Mr. Currants duties as special
master. The expense of any further trips to Salt Lake City over and above the
anticipated six to eight trips will be subject to further negotiation if and when they
become necessary. All other travel expenses of the special master beyond travel
from Seattle to Salt Lake City will be part of the special master's reasonable
expenses to be paid by the parties. Until further order of the Court, each party shall
timely pay one-half of the compensation to the master as it becomes due and each
party shall also pay one-half of the special master's reasonable expenses. The
master shall submit to the Court and counsel for both parties monthly statements
itemizing the time and expenses incurred in this proceeding and the work
performed. Each party shall have five (5) business days following receipt of the

2

master's monthly statement to file an objection with the Court concerning any
amount included in the statement and, if either party objects, the objection shall be
determined before the disputed amount is paid. The master shall not retain his
report as security for payments.
3.

Referred Issues. The issues relating to the amount of the Defendant's products
coated and the Defendant's coated products sold under the Agreements (attached as
Exhibit A through Exhibit E to Plaintiffs' Complaint) are hereby referred to the
master.

4.

Duties. The special master shall take evidence on, identify, and prepare a report to
the Court of his findings as to, the amount of Defendant's products coated and the
amount of Defendant's coated products sold under the Agreements. Attached to his
report, the special master shall include transcripts of any evidentiary proceedings
conducted by the master and copies of any exhibits submitted to the master.

5.

Powers. The master has and shall exercise the power to do all acts and take all
measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his duties under this
Order. Without limiting the broad scope of the master's powers, such powers shall
include the following: He may require the production before him of evidence upon
all matters embraced in this reference, including the production of all books, papers,
vouchers, documents, and writing applicable thereto, he may put witnesses under
oath, and himself examine witnesses and call the parties to the action and examine
them under oath provided that he shall not engage in ex parte communications with
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either party, the parties' counsel or with any owners, employees, agents or
representatives of any of the parties except as provided herein. The parties may
participate in all discovery proceedings conducted by the master and shall be given
adequate notice to sufficiently participate in any discovery proceedings. If either
party fails to appear at the time and place established by the master, the master may
proceed ex parte or, in his discretion, may adjourn the proceedings to a future date
giving notice to the absent party of the adjournment. Either party may procure the
attendance of witnesses before the master through the issuance and service of
subpoenas as provided in Rule 45, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If without
adequate excuse a witness fails to appear or give evidence, that witness will be
subject to punishment as for contempt and subject to the consequences, penalties,
and remedies provided in Rules 37 and 45, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as
determined by the Court. The parties may submit evidence to the master for his
consideration in connection with the performance of his duties hereunder.
6.

Procedure.
(a)

WitWnJen-ftOJa^ys after the date of entry of this Order, the master shall meet
with counsel for both parties to establish a plan for the preparation of the
master's report;

(b)

Within sixty (60) days after the date of entry of this Order, the master shall
report to the Court as to the status of his findings and the date on which his
report will be completed;
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(c)

The master shall submit his report to the Court and counsel for the parties and
each party shall have ten (10) days after receipt of the report to submit
objections and recommendations to the master concerning its contents;

(d)

After consideration of any such objections and recommendations, the master
shall within twenty (20) days submit his final report by filing it with the Clerk
of the Court together with the relevant documents, testimony, and other
evidence on which it is based, and providing a copy to counsel for each party;

(e)

Each party shall have ten (10) days after receipt of the master's final report to
file with the Court any objections to any part of the report. Application to the
Court for action upon the report and upon objections to the report shall be by
motion and upon notice as described in Rule 6(d), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court, after hearing upon any objections, may adopt the
report or may modify or reject the report in whole or in part or may receive
further evidence through hearings or trial or may recommit the report to the
master with instructions.

DATED this

ff

day of Beeember, 199X.

5

Approved and Accepted:

n
>—- _ _ ,

/
,

Jphn W. Curran
Special Master

y

The parties to this action hereby stipulate and consent to the appointment of John W.
Curran of Ernst & Young, LLP, as Special Master in this proceeding and also stipulate to and
approve the entry of this Order of Reference:
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

O'RORKE & GARDINER, LLC

Dale t. Gardiner
Mark C. Quinn
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

/ Harold G. Christensen
Attorneys for Defendant

6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document ORDER
OF REFERENCE was hand-delivered on the

c*7

day of January, 1999 to the

following:
Harold G. Christensen
Rodney R. Parker
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

. J.. • ' / — •-

L
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Third Judicial District
MAY - 6 2008
vv ^TyftALT LAKH COUNTY

By.
DGptityClefT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KENNETH L. FAILOR, et.al.,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER

vs.
MEGADYNE MEDICAL PRODUCTS,
INC., a Utah Corporation,
Defendant.

CIVIL NO. 98 090 7641 CN

JUDGE L.A. DEVER

This matter came on for hearing for arguments on pending motions The motions
are noted as:
1. Defendant's motion to strike jury demand of the Plaintiffs.
2 Plaintiff's objection to the final report of the Special Master.
3 Plaintiff's renewed motion to depose the Special Master.
4. Plaintiff's motion for an evidentiary hearing on report of Special Master.
5. Plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint.
The Plaintiff's were present and represented by Dale F. Gardiner. The
Defendant was represented by George Haley. The Court having considered the

arguments and memoranda of the parties, rules as follows:
1. This case involves an accounting issue. The parties previously agreed
that a special master was to be appointed and present his report to the Court.
Accounting is an equitable remedy and the Plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury on the
issue. Defendant's motion to strike the jury demand is granted.
2. Plaintiff's objections to the method of assembling the report of the
Special Master are noted. The Court has previously rejected the Plaintiff's objections as
they relate to the Special Master's exceeding the scope of the Order of Reference,
contacts with the parties, the filing of a work plan and the method of obtaining
documents from the Defendant. The Court, once again; denies these objections.
3. Plaintiff's request to depose the Special Master has previously been
denied. The Plaintiff has presented no new grounds for the Court to revisit this denial.
Plaintiff's Motion to Depose the Special Master is denied.
4. Plaintiff's Motion for a Hearing on the Report of the Special Master.
The Utah R. Civ. P. 53 provides that the Court is to accept the Report of the Special
Master's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. An objection to the report
has been made accompanied by a request for a hearing. Based upon the allegations of
error coupled with a report from the Plaintiff's expert, the Court determines that it is
proper to grant the Plaintiff's request for a hearing on the Report of the Special Master.
2

The Court has some concerns about the scope of such a hearing. Therefore, it directs
that the parties meet, agree to a proposed format and consult with the Court to finalize
the procedures to be followed.
5 Plaintiffs Motion to file an Amended Complaint is denied. This case is
ten years old. The new issues raised by the Amended Complaint cannot be addressed
in an accounting issue case. If the Plaintiff's desire to raise these new issues, they will
have to do it in a separate action.

THIS IS THE ORDER OF THE COURT.
Dated this 6,h day of May, 2008.

BY THE COURT

Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed,
postage prepaid, on the llP

day May, 2008, to the following:

George M. Haley
J. Andrew Sjoblom
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP
299 South Main Street, Ste 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-5800

Dale F. Gardiner
VANCOTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & McCARTHY
36 South State Street Ste 1900
Salt Lake City, UT84111
John W. Curran, Special Master
ERNST & YOUNG, LLP
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3500
Seattle, WA 98104

Deputy Court Clerk
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

< %

ooOoo-Kenneth L. Failor;
Premium Plastics, Inc.;
and Mary Gilmer,

ORDER
Case No. 20080459-CA

Petitioners,
v.

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Megadyne Medical Products,
Inc., fka American Medical
Products, Inc.
Respondents.

Third Judicial District

JUN 2 7 2008
Deputy Clerk

Before Judges Bench, Davis, and McHugh
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to Rule 5 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to
appeal is GRANTED. This court will notify the parties upon
setting a briefing schedule.

DATED th is

^day of June, 2001

FOR THE COURT:

6 Trie
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge

'"^

•?>.
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1988

Mr. Kenneth L. Failor
3434 West 12600 South
Riverton, Utah 84065
Re:

Compensation Agreement

Dear Ken:
The purpose of this letter is to rr.ei
agreement regarding the payment of compensation to you by American
Medical Products, Inc. ("AMP") and certain other matters.
The
agreement we have reached is as follows:
1.
Term and Scope. This Agreement shall commence upon the
execution hereof by you, and shall continue for a term of nine (9)
years thereafter, unless earlier terminated as set
forth
in
Paragraph 7 hereof.
The parties hereto acknowledge and agree that
this Agreement and the compensation to be paid to you shall apply
only to those products of AMP commonly known as the "E/Z Clean
Cautery Tip1', the "E/Z Clean Needle Tip", the "E/Z Clean Extended
Blade Tip" and the "E/Z" Clean Ball Electrode" (collectively, the
"AMP Products")• The parties hereto specifically agree that this
Agreement
shall
supersede, cancel and terminate that certain
Agreement, dated as of May 12, 1987, by and between AMP, you and KF
Manufacturing; provided, however, that you agree to continue to
assist AMP in facilitating the manufacture of the AMP Products until
the definitive exclusive manufacturing agreement referred to ir>
Paragraph 4 hereof has been executed.
2.
Compensation. AMP shall pay you compensation according to
the following schedule for each unit of AMP Products actually sold t™
customers of AMP during the term hereof:

Mr. Kenneth L. Failor
April 20, 1988
Page 2

Years 1-3

$0.08/unit

Year 4

0.07/unit

Year 5

0.06/unit

Years 6-9

0.05/unit

Such compensation shall be payable in arrears, and will be paid on a
monthly basis as, if and when AMP receives payment for the AMP
Products from its customers.
3.
Inspection of Books and Records. Upon reasonable notice,
during normal business hours, and in the offices and presence of an
officer or representative of AMP, you shall be entitled to inspect
those books and records of AMP pertaining to actual sales of the AMP
Products to customers of AMP to ensure compliance herewith.
4.
Release of PPI. In consideration of the compensation to be
paid hereunder, you hereby agree to unconditionally release and
discharge in writing PPI from all of its obligations under that
certain Manufactures License Agreement dated as of
,
1987 by and between PPI and KF Manufacturing, the parties hereto
intending that such Agreement be superseded, cancelled and terminated
hereby. Contemporaneously with the execution hereof, you shall
execute and deliver to the attorney of AMP the form of Release
attached hereto as Exhibit A # which shall be held by such attorney
pending the negotiation of a definitive exclusive manufacturing
agreement by and between AMP and PPI.
5.
Reaffirmation. You hereby specifically reaffirm to AMP
that you have assigned to AMP all of your right, title and interest
in and to the AMP Products, the process whereby the non-stick surface
coating is applied to the AMP Products (the "Process") and all patent
and trademark applications made regarding the AMP Products and the
Process, and any and all derivatives, improvements and modifications
to the AMP Products and the Process. Henceforth, your only interest
with respect to such matters and AMP shall be the receipt of the
compensation set forth in Paragraph 2 hereof.
6.
Confidentiality. You hereby specifically reaffirm your
obligations of confidentiality to AMP as set forth in that certain
Agreement of Confidentiality dated as of March 20, 1987, by and
between AMP and you.

Mr. Kenneth L. Failor
April 20, 1988
Page 3

7.
Termination and Buy-Out Provision. This Agreement may be
terminated prior to the lapse of the term set forth in Paragraph 1
hereof in the event that all of the issued and outstanding common
stock of AMP is bought by any other person or entity. In such an
event, AMP shall exert best efforts to cause any such purchaser to
assume all of the obligations of AMP hereunder. If such purchaser
does not agree to assume such obligations, you shall receive the
present value of the amount resulting from the operation of the
following formula:
(AMVJ(COMP)(y)
where
AMV

=

the aggregate average monthly volume of AMP Products
sold
during the twelve month period
immediately
preceding such sale of AMP;

COMP =

the prevailing rate of compensation payable to you
during the year in which any such sale of AMP occurs;
and

y

the number of years remaining in the term hereof from
the date of any such sale of AMP, as determined by the
following schedule:

«

Years 1-4
Year 5
Year 6
Year 7
Year 8

y
y
y
y
y

=
=
=
=
=

5
4
3
2
1

the parties hereto understanding that the provisions
of this Section 7 shall be inapplicable to any sale of
AMP occurring in the final twelve months hereof.
The amount payable pursuant to this Section 7, if any, shall be paid
by AMP as, if and when AMP receives the proceeds of any such sale
from its purchaser.
8.
Assistance to AMP. You agree to assist AMP from time to
time in facilitating and preserving the relationship between AMP and
PPI, to ensure that the manufacturing process of the AMP Products is
accomplished in an orderly, timely and workmanlike manner.

Mr. Kenneth L. Failor
April 20, 1988
Page 4

9.
Entire Agreement. This Agreement and all exhibits hereto
constitute the complete and entire agreement between the parties
hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof.
The execution and
delivery hereof shall not constitute a waiver or relinquishment on
the part of AMP of any of its rights relating to any matters giving
rise to this Agreement.
No statement or agreement, oral or written,
made prior to or contemporaneously with the execution hereof and no
course of dealing or practice by either party hereto prior to or
after the execution hereof shall vary or modify the written terms of
this Agreement.
10. Amendment. This Agreement may be amended only by a written
document or instrument signed by the parties, stating that such
document is intended to amend the provisions of this Agreement.
11. Notices.
Any
notices, requests,
demands
or
other
communications permitted or required to be made shall be delivered
personally, by telegram, telex or by certified U.S. mail, postage
prepaid, at the following addresses:
To AMP:

American Medical Products, Inc.
6202 Stratler Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Attn:

Matthias R. Sansom
Vice President

With copy to:

Jeffrey D. Wilson, Esq.
Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest &
Minick, P.C.
5400 Renaissance Tower
Dallas, Texas 75270

To Failor:

Kenneth L. Failor
3434 West 12600 South
Riverton, Utah 84107

With copy to:

Thomas D. Neeleman, Esq.
1061 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

12. Assignment. You shall not assign this Agreement or any of
your rights or obligations hereunder without the express prior
written consent of AMP.

Mr. Kenneth L. Failor
April 20, 1988
Page b

13. Transactional Expenses. Each party hereto shall bear its
own costs and expenses incurred in connection with the preparation,
negotiation, execution and delivery of this Agreement.
14. Binding Effect. This Agreement shall inure to the
of your heirs, successors and assigns.

benefit

15. Governing Law. This Agreement is executed in, performable
at least in part in and shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
Your execution, in the space provided below, shall evidence that
you have read, understood and agreed to be bound by the provisions
hereof. Please execute the three (3) copies of this Letter Agreement
and the Release attached thereto as Exhibit A, and promptly return
two (2) executed copies to the undersigned.
Sincerely,
AMERICAN MEDICAL. PRODUCTS, INC

:5sSk^<

^

Matthias R. Sansom,
Vice President
AGREED AND ACCEPTED:

April ^ Q

, 1988

KENNETH L. FAILOR, Individually

1<-£*-fP

By: / [ j ^

__

mneth L. F a i l o r ,
President

282:D041388AA.00
041988shll

^

—

^

^
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Exhibit A
RELEASE
For value received, the undersigned hereby unconditionally
releases and discharges Premium Plastics, Inc. ("PPI") and its
officers, director and shareholders from all of its obligations
to the undersigned pursuant to that certain Manu factures License
Agreement by and between the undersigned and PPI , dated as of
, 1987, relating to the manufacture of certain
electro-surgical and medical instruments by PPI on behalf of
American Medical Products, Inc. ("AMP"); shal 1 permit and not
negotiation,
object to or in any way interfere with th e
preparation, execution and delivery of an exclusi ve manufacturing
agreement between AMP and PPI; and acknowledges a nd affirms that
PPI and its officers, directors and shareholde rs shall have no
further obligation or liability of any nature wha tsoever to the
undersigned.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned
delivered this Release as of April
, 1988.

has

executed

and

KENNETH L. FAILOR,
Individually

2 ^ :
-7

-j/

r

/- ** -fp

KF MANUFAC;fU#ING, INC.
By; -JL t,u*viA+_
Kenneth L. Fadlor,
President

?82:D041388AA.OO
)41988shll

y-^^-//

ADDENDUM TO COMPENSATION AGREEMENT
^1^

This addendum dated this
to

that

April

day of April, 1988, pertains

certain Compensation Agreement ("The Agreement")

20,

1988,

dated

by and between American Medical Products

("AMP") and Kenneth L. Failor and KF Manufacturing

Inc.

("KFM").

NOTWITHSTANDING paragraph 9 of the agreement and pursuant to
paragraph 10 of the agreement and in consideration of the
promises

contained

therein

the parties additionally

mutual

agree

as

times

be

follows:
1)

Kenneth

considered

L.

Failor

independent

or

KFM

contractors

shall
for

at

the

all

purpose

of

this

agreement.
2)

As a condition of the pending

exclusive

agreement

to be entered into between AMP and PPI

paragraph

4 of the agreement,

vide

Kenneth

L.

Failor

manufacturing
referenced

in

AMP shall require that PPI Pro-

with

invoice

copies

detailing

all

purchases of AMP products by AMP.
3)

For the purposes of clarification,

the following

shall

be included in Paragraph 7.
a. the discount rate to be applied to the buy-out funds
shall be 6.5% (six and one-half percent.)
b. for

the purposes of calculating AMV,

the

monthly

volume during the initial 12 months of the contract
period
125,000

shall
units

actually sold.

be
per

considered to be the
month or the

number

greater
of

of

units

4)
hold

The parries hereby relinquish,

and agree

each the other harmless from any causes of action

imagined

which

may have arisen as a result of or in

with past dealings between the parties.

AGREED AND ACCEPTED:
KENNETH L. FA1L0R,

April

Z/

/ 1988,

Individually

KF MANUFACTURING
By :

release,

c^

Kenneth L.^ i Failor
President

/-z/-rf

AMERX^N MEDICAL PRODUCTS^, INC.
Matthias R. Sansorn
Vice President

real

to
or

connection

ADDENDUM TO COMPENSATION AGREEMENT
This addendum dated this
to

that

April

day of April, 1988, pertains

certain Compensation Agreement ("The Agreement")

20,

1988,

dated

by and between American Medical Products

("AMP") and Kenneth L. Failor and KF Manufacturing

Inc.

("KFM").

NOTWITHSTANDING paragraph 9 of the agreement and pursuant to
paragraph 10 of the agreement and in consideration of the
promises

contained

therein

the parties additionally

mutual

agree

as

times

be

follows:
1)

Kenneth

considered

L.

Failor

independent

or

KFM

contractors

shall
for

at

the

all

purpose

of

this

agreement.
2)

As a condition of the pending

exclusive

agreement

to be entered into between AMP and PPI

paragraph

4 of the agreement,

vide

Kenneth

L.

Failor

manufacturing
referenced

in

AMP shall require that PPI Pro-

with

invoice

copies

detailing

all

purchases of AMP products by AMP.
3)

For the purposes of. clarification,

the following

shall

be included in Paragraph 7.
a. the discount rate to be applied to the buy-out funds
shall be 6.5% (six and one-half percent.)
b. for

the purposes of calculating AMV,

the

monthly

volume during the initial 12 months of the contract
period
125,000

shall
units

actually sold.

be
per

considered to be tie
month or the

number

greater
of

of

jnits

4)
hold

The parties hereby relinquish,

release,

and agree

each the other harmless from any causes of action

imagined

which

may have arisen as a result of or in

with past dealings between the parties.

AGREED AND ACCEPTED:

April

KENNETH L. FAILOR, Individually

KF MANUFACTURING
By:
Kenneth L. Failor
President

AMERICAN MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC.
By:

Matthias R. Sansom
Vice President

, 1988.

real

to
or

connection
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EXCLUSIVE PRODUCT COATING AGREEMENT
THIS EXCLUSIVE PRODUCT COATING AGREEMENT is entered into as
of the 1st day of June, 1988, by and between American Medical
Products, Inc., a Utah corporation ("AMP"), and Premium Plastics,
Inc., a California corporation ("PPI").
W I T N E S S E T H :
WHEREAS, AMP has conceived and developed the concept of
applying a non-stick surface (the "Coating") to certain electrosurgical instruments used in
performing
certain
surgical
procedures (the "Process Technology"), has developed such coated
electro-surgical instruments (the "AMP Products") for marketing
purposes and has applied for patents (the "Patents") with respect
to both the Process Technology and the AMP Products;
WHEREAS, AMP has consulted with PPI with respect
coating of the AMP Products in commercial quantities;
WHEREAS, PPI is capable of
commercial quantities for AMP;

coating

the

AMP

to

Products

the
in

WHEREAS, AMP desires to engage and employ PPI, and PPI
desires to accept such engagement. as the exclusive product
coater of the AMP Products for and on behalf of AMP, to apply the
Coating to the AMP Products by means of the Process Technology;
and
WHEREAS, AMP and PPI have determined that such engagement is
in their respective and mutual best interests, and that this
Agreement should supersede, cancel and terminate all previous
understandings and arrangements with respect to the subject
matter hereof.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the premises and
the mutual covenants and promises set forth herein, and for other
good and valuable consideration, the delivery, receipt and
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto
agree as follows:
1.
Grant of Exclusive Product Coating Rights. Subject to
the terms and conditions set forth herein, AMP hereby engages and
employs PPI, and PPI hereby accepts such
engagement
and
employment, as the only person authorized to apply the Coating to
the AMP Products by means of the Process Technology during the
term hereof.
Upon receipt of an order or proposed order, AMP
shall notify PPI of the tentative delivery date to PPI and the
desired completion date for applying the Coating to the AMP

Products. PPI will acknowledge the best and fastest delivery
date that it can meet.
In consideration of such exclusive
employment and engagement, PPI shall exert best efforts in good
faith to satisfy on a timely basis the delivery dates requested
by AMP and its customers. PPI shall not apply the Coating or use
the Process Technology (or any subsequently-developed refinements
of either of them) to electro-surgical cautery
instruments for
the benefit of any person or entity other than AMP without the
express written consent of AMP, which consent may be withheld
in
the sole and absolute discretion of AMP. Nothing herein shall be
construed to limit the ability of PPI to apply coating materials
for
other
products that are not electro-surgical cautery
instruments.
2.
Term. Unless earlier terminated as provided herein,
the initial term of this Agreement shall commence as of the date
first written above, and shall continue in full force and effect
for a period of ten (10) years therefrom. Thereafter, this
Agreement shall be deemed to have been automatically renewed and
extended under the same provisions hereof for an additional,
successive period of ten (10) years unless notice is given in
writing thirty (30) days prior to the lapse of such initial term
by either party evidencing the intent of such party not to renew
and extend the term hereof.
3.

Compensation to PPI.

(a) The full and sole compensation to which PPI is
entitled for coating the AMP Products under this Agreement
shall, for all of the AMP Products identified below that are
actually received by AMP pursuant hereto, be calculated as
follows:
(i)
month:

For volume of

E/Z Clean Cautery Tip

-

E/Z Clean Needle Tip

-

less

than

AD

Cents/Tip

A0

10,000

units

Cents/Tip

E/Z Clean Extended
Blade Electrode

70

Cents/Electrode

E/Z Clean Ball Electrode -

45

Cents/Electrode

per

(ii) For volume greater than 10,000 but less
125,000 units per month:
E/Z Clean Cautery Tip

-

33

Cents/Tip

E/Z Clean Needle Tip

-

37

Cents/Tip

E/Z Clean Extended
Blade Electrode

-

66

Cents/Electrode

E/Z Clean Ball Electrode 1

(i i'i)
month:

^3

For volume greater

than

Cents/Electrode
than

125,000

units

E/Z Clean Cautery Tip

-

25

Cents/Tip

E/Z Clean Needle Tip

-

28

Cents/Tip

E/Z Clean Extended
Blade Electrode

-

53

Cents/Electrode

E/Z Clean Ba^l ^Electrode -

33

Cents/Electrode

per

provided, movever, that the compensation applicable to the
E/Z Clean Extended Blade Electrode and the* E/Z Clean Ball
Electrode set forth above shall be only for the first three
(3) months after the commencement of production thereof, to
enable the resolution of certain technical
production
difficulties, the parties hereto agreeing that the level of
compensation established at the end of such three
(3)-month
period shall apply until the first annual review of such
compensation referred to in Subsection (b) below, so that
thereafter the compensation relating to all of the AMP
Products will be reviewed at the same time. PPI agrees that
it shall furnish duplicate copies of all such invoices to
Kenneth L. Failor.
(b) The parties hereto agree that they shall in good
faith
review
such
compensation on the first annual
anniversary hereof (and
at
each
annual
anniversary
thereafter throughout the term hereof), and shall, at each
such time, adjust such compensation as the parties hereto
may mutually agree.
If no agreement with respect to such
compensation is reached after thirty (30) days after such
anniversary, this Agreement may be terminated by either AMP
or PPI. The parties hereto expressly understand and agree
that nothing in this Agreement
is intended or shall be
construed as a grant of any right, title or interest to PPI
in or to the Process Technology as it relates to the AMP
Products, the AMP Products or the Patents, or of any equity
interest in AMP.
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(c) The AMP Products shall be shipped FOB Paramount,
California or, in the event the production and coating
facilities of PPI are relocated, FOB Plant. Shipping
costs
for the AMP Products to and from PPI shall be the sole
responsibility of AMP. Payment of all invoices submitted by
PPI to AMP shall be on the terms "Net Due End of Month
Proximate." There shall be a minimum order charge of Forty
Dollars ($40.00) per invoice.
4.
Relation of the Parties. PPI shall at all times during
the term hereof have the status of an independent cQntractor.
Nothing herein shall be construed to create a relationship of
principal and agent or of master and servant between AMP and PPI,
or create any liability in either party for the acts or omissions
of the other, or grant any right to either party to commit the
other to any obligation to anyone else.
5.
Volume Requi rements. PPI acknowledges and agrees that,
as the exclusive product coater of the AMP Products, it shall
timely and in a workmanlike manner coat that quantity of AMP
Products as AMP and PPI shall specify from time to time, PPI
understanding that the timetable for such product coating may
change from time to time, and that time is of the essence in this
Agreement. PPI shall exert best efforts in good faith and shall
take all necessary and proper steps from time to time to ensure
that any and all such timetables are satisfied. tfhere shall be
no minimum quantity requirements applicable to this Agreement;
provided, however, that AMP shall pay the minimum order charge
specified in Section 3(c) hereof per run of the AMP Products. In
the event that PPI is unable to satisfy any such timetables, AMP
shall be entitled, at its sole and exclusive option, to retain
the services of other persons or entities to the extent necessary
to timely satisfy the quantity requirements of AMP, and PPI shall
cooperate with AMP and such other person or entity in any such
event.
6.
The Process Technology. Immediately upon the execution
and delivery of this Agreement, PPI shall furnish to AMP a full,
precise, complete and detailed written copy of the Process
Technology
(including,
without
limitation,
the
detailed
sequential steps involved in successfully utilizing the Process
Technology and the ingredients or materials used in connection
therewith). PPI acknowledges that the concept of applying
the
Coating to the AMP Products by means of the Process Technology is
a proprietary asset of AMP as it applies to the AMP Products, and
that all information not in the public domain relating to such
concept shall be surrendered to AMP upon the termination of this
Agreement
or upon the death or incapacity of Mr. Gilmer,
whichever occurs earlier. PPI and Mr. Gilmer agree to cooperate
with AMP to any extent that may be necessary to augment or
perfect the applications for the Patents, and AMP agrees to

-4-

reimburse PPl for reasonable costs
providing such assistance, if any.

and

expenses incurred in

7.
Acquisition of PPI by AMP. PPI acknowledges that AMP
has expressed an interest in acquiring PPI. The matter of any
such acquisition shall be the subject of future negotiations and
agreements by and between AMP and Harvey Van Epps Gilmer, Jr.,
his successors, heirs and assigns.
8.
Events of Default. A material breach of any of the
terms, conditions, obligations or performances of this Agreement,
or a succession of such breaches which are not of
themselves
material but have a cumulative effect that constitutes a material
breach hereof shall, unless cured within thirty (30) days of the
receipt of written notice thereof, constitute an event of default
hereunder, and shall entitle the non-defaulting
party
to
(i) pursue any applicable legal and equitable remedies, including
specific performance, incidental and consequential damages and
the recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees; and (ii) in its sole
and absolute discretion, terminate this Agreement. For purposes
of this Section 8, a material breach of this Agreement shall be
defined to include, but is not limited to, (x) the failure of PPI
to satisfy the timeliness, quality or volume requirements of AMP,
(y) the failure of the representation and warranty of PPI set
forth in Section 14(f) hereof to be true anc\ correct in all
material respects at any time during the term hereof and (z) the
bankruptcy or insolvency of PPI. All of the rights, remedies and
powers of the parties hereunder shall be deemed cumulative and
not exclusive of any other rights, remedies and powers available
at law or in equity.
9.

Conf identiality.

(a) PPI shall not disclose the terms and conditions of
this Agreement, its relationship with or identity of AMP, or
any information regarding the Coating or the
Process
Technology as they relate to AMP Products, the AMP Products,
the Patents, other proprietary information of AMP, know-how,
sketches, formulae, reports, processes, drawings, notes,
technical expertise, technical or
non-technical
data,
engineering
or design, marketing or sale
information,
programs or any translations, copies or
reproductions
thereof to any person or entity under any circumstances
whatsoever without the express prior written consent of AMP,
which consent may be withheld in the sole and absolute
discretion of AMP.
(b) All of the information described in Subsection (a)
above that is in the possession of PPI during the term
hereof shall be plainly and conspicuously
marked
as
"CONFIDENTIAL" by PPI and shall be preserved and protected
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by means of such reasonable and prudent
precautions,
safeguards and security measures as are necessary in the
circumstances including, but not limited to, (i) restriction
of public access to the premises of PPI where (A) such
information is kept or stored, (B) the Coating and the
Process Technology is used to coat the AMP Products; and
(C) the AMP Products are stored prior to shipment to AMP;
(ii) execution and delivery to PPI (with copies to AMP) of
confidentiality agreements by each employee or agent of PPI;
and
(iii) reasonable and prudent steps to ensure the
security of the premises of PPI both during $nd after
business hours; and (iv) all other necessary and proper
precautions and safeguards to avoid any possible deliberate
or inadvertent disclosure of such information to any person
or entity.
(c) The obligation of confidentiality set forth in
this
Section 9 shall survive the termination of this
Agreement for a period of five (5) years.
10. Force Majeure. No failure or omission by either AMP or
PPI in the performance of any obligation hereunder shall be
deemed a breach of this Agreement or create any liability for
damages if such failure or omission shall arise from any cause
beyond the control or influence of either AMP or PPI, including
the action of or compliance with any laws, rule's, regulations,
orders or decrees by any governmental authority prohibiting the
use of the Process Technology or the Coating or its constitutent
chemical elements for the coating of electro-surgical instruments
or otherwise or the revocation of any requisite approvals,
licenses, permits or consents relating to the Coating, the
Process Technology, the Patents or the AMP Products, or caused by
any natural disaster, civil unrest, act of war or labor dispute.
11. Trademarks and Tradenames of AMP. Nothing herein shall
be construed as the grant of any right, title, interest, license
or permission in or for the use by PPI of any of the trademarks,
tradenames, service marks or logos of AMP in connection with any
aspect of the business of PPI without the express prior written
consent of AMP, which consent may be withheld in the sole and
absolute discretion of AMP.
12. The Patents. PPI understands and acknowledges that
(i) AMP has applied for patents covering both the AMP Products
and the Process Technology; (ii) such applications are presently
pending; (iii) if granted, the Patents will be the sole and
absolute property of AMP; and (iv) nothing herein shall be
construed as the grant to PPI of any right, title or interest in
or to the Patents. PPI hereby agrees to cooperate with and
assist AMP as needed to more fully perfect such applications and
shall comply with any request for information made by AMP in
-6-

connection
therewith.
AMP shall reimburse any reasonable
expenses incurred by PPI in providing such assistance, if any.
13. Assignment. PPI shall not assign, in whole or in part,
this Agreement or any monies or other rights, benefits or
obligations hereunder without the prior written consent of AMP,
which consent may be withheld in the sole and absolute discretion
of AMP. Any assignment as to which such prior written consent
has not been given by AMP shall be null and void. No assignment
of this Agreement by reason of the acquisition of PPI by another
person or entity shall be made unless such other person.or entity
provides satisfactory assurances to AMP of its ability to perform
the provisions of this Agreement and executes and delivers a copy
of this Agreement to AMP. The acceptance of any such assurances
shall be at the sole and absolute discretion of AMP.
14. Representations and Warranties of PPI. In addition to
those representations and warranties set forth in Section 7
hereof, PPI hereby represents, certifies and warrants to AMP
that:
(a) PPI is a corporation duly organized,
validy
existing and in good standing under the laws of the State of
California;
(b) The execution and delivery by PPI
of
this
Agreement has been duly and validy authorized by all
requisite corporate action, and PPI has all requisite power
and
authority to perform its obligations, duties and
liabi1it ies hereunder;
(c) Neither the execution and delivery
of
this
Agreement
nor
the
consummation
of the transactions
contemplated herein, nor compliance with the terms hereof
will conflict with, result
in a breach of, constitute a
default under or violate the terms of the Articles of
Incorporation
or
Bylaws
of PPI, or any law, rule,
regulation, judgment, decree, contract, agreement or order
to which PPI is a party or by which PPI or any of its assets
are bound;
(d) None of the employees of PPI are represented by
any union or subject to any collective bargaining agreement;
(e) PPI is in compliance with all applicable federal,
state and local laws, ordinances, rules and regulations with
respect to the business conducted by it and the ownership of
its assets;
the

(f) The authority and right of PPI to use and apply
Coating and the constituent chemical elements thereof

remains in full force and effect, and has not been revoked
by any person or entity having proprietary rights thereto
through which PPI has received its right and authority, the
parties hereto intending that the loss or revocation of any
such authority and right from any such person or entity
shall constitute an event of default hereunder; and
(g) This Agreement constitutes the valid and binding
obligation of PPI, enforceable against PPI in accordance
with the terms hereof, except as such enforcement may be
limited
by
any applicable bankruptcy, reorganization,
insolvency, moratorium or other laws affecting creditors'
rights generally.
15. Representations and Warranties
represents, certifies and warrants that:

of

AMP.

AMP

hereby

(a) AMP is a corporation duly organized,
validy
existing and in good standing under the laws of the State of
Utah;
(b) The execution and delivery by AMP
of
this
Agreement has been duly and validy authorized by all
requisite corporate action, and AMP has all requisite power
and
authority to perform its obligations, duties and
1iabi1ities hereunder;
(c) Neither the execution and delivery
of
this
Agreement
nor
the
consummation
of the transactions
contemplated herein, nor compliance with the terms hereof
will conflict with, result in a breach of, constitute a
default under or violate the terms of the Articles of
Incorporation
or
Bylaws
of AMP, or any law, rule,
regulation, judgment, decree, contract, agreement or order
to which AMP is a party or by which AMP or any of its assets
are bound; and
(d) This Agreement constitutes the valid and binding
obligation of AMP, enforceable against PPI in accordance
with the terms hereof, except as such enforcement may be
limited
by
any applicable bankruptcy, reorganization,
insolvency/ moratorium or other laws affecting creditors'
rights generally.
16. Inspections
by
AMP.
PPI
shall
permit
the
representatives of AMP to visit and tour the premises of PPI and
inspect the AMP Products, during normal business hours, upon
reasonable notice.
17. Quality Control. PPI shall
enforce such standards, procedures

-8-

establish, implement and
and inspections of quality

c 01 itrc 1 as are r tecessary to ensure that the AMP Products coated
by PPI are of first quality and are being coated in a workmanlike
manner. AMP shall have the right, exercisable i 1 i Its sole ai id
absolute discretion, to reject or revoke acceptance of any AMP
Products not satisfying its specifications or quality control
standards.
1 8 , Inteqrat ion . This Agreement . - 11uteL
I I.... comp 1 eL^
and entire agreement between the _
*ereto and is intended
to supersede any and all prior agreements with respect to
subject matter hereof. No other previous statement, agreement
understanding, oral oi wi ittei I, ai id r IO course of dealing •. r
practice by either party hereto shall vary or modify the wr*
terms hereof. The parties hereto agree and intend that this
Agreement shall supersede, cancel and terminate -that certain
Exclusive Manufactures Agreement by and between PPI and KF
Manufacturing, and PPI hereby acknowledges receipt of a written
Release *ith r-spe"', (hereto from Kenneth L. Failor and KF
M a n u f ar
•'.-:;
- r • * i e < i h e r e 11 > a s B x h i b i t A .
A m e n d m e n t s , 'If LIS Agreement may be amended oi ily uy
written document or instrument signed by the parties hereto,
stating that such document or instrument is intended to amend *
p rov i s i ons he r eo f
20. Not ices.
Any notices, r e q u e s t s ^ demands or other
communications permitted or required to be made pursuant to this
Agreement shall be delivered personally, by telegram, telex or by
certified U.S. mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid,
at the following addresses:
• r"o AMF • i

American Medica 1 Products, Inc.
6202 Stratler Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Matthias R. Sansom,
Vice President

wi

Jeffrey D. Wilson, Esq.
Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest
& Minick, P.C
5400 Renaissance Tower
1201 Elm Street
Dallas, Texas 75270

To PPI;

Premium Plastics, Ii ic.
15542 Vermont Avenue
Par amou n t, Ca1i f orn i a 90723
Attention:

9

Harvey Van Epps Gilmer, ,I

T o Kenneth L. Failoi
(duplicate copies of
invoices only)

Kenneth L. Failor
3434 West 12600 South
Rivei toi i, Utah 84 06 5

Mrm

21 . Binding Effect.
I" I i e p i o v i s i o n s o f 11 i i s A g r e e m e n t
sha11 # whether or not so expressed, be bIndi i ig upor i and si la 1 1
inure to the benefit of and be enforceable by a n d against t h e
p a r t i e s hereto and their respective s u c c e s s o r s , assigns a n d
he i rs
2 2 .
N O 1II"I M I A C U
rroxvci .
INIi a c t i o n t \r • n -jr i i u p > "V" I "it1
p a r t i e s hereto with respect
i «i i i) a
" waiver
" h e c o or
veil ar ne lt isn,q uciosnd
or o b l i g a t i o n s hereof shall constitute
h m ie niti o n s
for the future of a n y right, covenant, c o n d i t i o n or o p t i o n
c o n t a i n e d herein.unless there exists a wi itten waiver of rights
d u l y executed by A M P and P P 1 . A n y waiver of p e r f o r m a n c e in o n e
instance shall not constitute a waiver in any other
instance
w h e t h e r before or after the execution of such waiver", and a n y
s u c h waived provisions sha] 1 - o - - - - - n full f orre ~md c f f erf
in
al1 other r\rcumstances.

c<

Governing Law, This Agreement shall be governed by
in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto havt ^r,.u*ed
del ivered thi s Agreemer it as c f tl :ie date ^nH V P / :
above.
T

AMERICAN MEDICAL PRODUCT?
^S3CT^>^^

By

V- •

MC

__}>^=Aw^r-

Matthias R. Sansom
Vice President
PREMIUM PLASTICS, INC
By

Harvey \Atfn Epps Gilmer,
Preside/*

J

P^y

u
282:D032288D.00
060188shll
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AGREEMENT
v*
Agreement is made and entered into this
czX L*
day
\V\^^LJCAA
, 1 9 i ^ by and between MegaDyne Medical Products. Inc., a Utah
corporation and prior to a name change known as American Medical Products, Inc.
(MegaDyne), and Premium Plastics, Inc., a California corporation (PPI) and Harvey
Van Epps Gilmer Jr., an individual (Gilmer)
vv

This

WHEREAS, MegaDyne has conceived and developed the concept of applying a Teflon
non-stick surface (Coating) to certain electro-surgical instruments used in performing
certain surgical procedures (the Process Technology), has developed such coated
electro-surgical instruments (the MegaDyne Products) for marketing purposes and has
received the patents (the Patents) for both the Process Technoloov an l MegaDyne
Products, and
WHEREAS, MegaDyne and PPI previously entered into an agreement as of the 1st
day of June, 1988 (the 1988 Agreement), pursuant to which PPI was granted and
accepted, under the terms and conditions of the 1988 Agreement, rights as the exclusive
product coater of MegaDyne Products using the Process Technology, and
WHEREAS, Gilmer is president and sole or inajority shareholder of PPI, and
*o sell his business, and
WHEREAS, MegaDyne desires to insure the availability of Glli nei to provide
technical support and consultation services to MegaDyne after the sale of PPI or such
earlier dates as hereinafter provided, and
WHEREAS, PPI and Gilmer, pursuant to the 1988 Agreement and performance
thereunder, have been provided with and have obtained information, knowledge and
experience in connection with MegaDyne Products, the Process Technology and the
Patents, and
WHEREAS, MegaDyne desires to assemble a plant, equipment, knowledge and
technology with which to itself apply the Coating to MegaDyne Products by means of the
Process Technology and desires to engage Gilmer as a consultant, upon the terms and
conditions contained herein, to provide MegaDyne with direction, knowledge, expertise
and experience to apply the Coating with the same expertise and competence heretofore
accomplished by PPI, and
WHEREAS, all parties desire and are in agreement that the 1988 Agreement be
modified and continued as hereinafter provided,
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the promises, the terms and conditions
hereof and other good and valuable consideration, the delivery, receipt and sufficiency of
which are hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows:

1

1. CONDITION PRECEDENT. The sale of PP! is Ihe condition precedent {-Condition
Precedent") to the modification of the 1988 contracl and all new duties and obligations
imposed by this contract on the parties. The sale of PPI is defined as the close of escrow
between Gilmer and the new buyer(s) that transfers ownership and control of PPI or the
majority of its assets to the new buyer(s) regardless of the structure of I!ic sale
between Gilmer and the new Buyer. In connection with this Condition Precedent PPI and
Gilmer:
A. Represent, warrant and agree that PPI presently has and at all times
prior to completion by Gilmer of the services to be performed by him in
paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 hereof, PPI will have in its employment a person other
than Gilmer who is and will be as thoroughly familiar with the Process
Technology and all aspects of application of the Coating to MegaDyne surgical
instruments as is Gilmer. Such other person shall be able to and will perlorm
the services referred to in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 hereof in the event Gilmer
should die or become incapacitated prior to completion of such services himself;
B. Agree if Gilmer shall die or become permanently incapacitated prior to
occurrence of the Condition Precedent and completion of the paragraphs 3, 4, and
5 services, then the Condition Precedent shall immediately terminate, if it has
not already occurred, and PPI and/or Gilmer shall cause the paragraphs 3, 4, and
5 services to forthwith be performed by such other person. Gilmer shall be
deemed permanently incapacitated if by reason of accident, illness or otherwise
i(f after a six month period from the date of the accident, illness or otherwise he
is unable to reasonably and regularly perform those tasks and duties at PP!
which he is and has been regularly performing prior to ihe accident, illness or
otherwise happening,
C. Agree that if the Condition Precedent has not otherwise occurrp.'1 •
been terminated within 3 years from the date of execution befool id
if
Condition Precedent shall terminate at the end of such three year r i i i I
2 MODIFICATION AND CONTINUANCE OF 1988 AGREEMENT. The designation and
grant in the 1988 Agreement of and to PPI as the exclusive products coater and the only
person or entity authorized to apply the Coating to MegaDyne Products is hereby
modified on the happening of the Condition Precedent, and then PPI shall no longer the
only person or entity authorized to apply the Coating to MegaDyne Products by means of
the Process Technology. Thereafter, MegaDyne shall have first right to apply the Coating
to MegaDyne Products by means of the Process Technology at and through use of its own
facilities and employees or a Designee. PPI shall be relieved of all obligations imposed
updn it under the 1988 Agreement for all MegaDyne Products for which PPI does not
apply the Coating to and to which MegaDyne or a MegaDyne Designee applies the Coating
as In this paragraph provided. All obligations imposed under the 1988 Agreement shall
continue to be imposed upon and shall be performed by PPI for all MegaDyne Products
for which PPI shall continue to or shall hereafter apply the Coating.
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3. GILMER SERVICES. At the request and direction
MegaDyne, Gilmer shall
consult with and lurnish and provide to MegaDyne or its Designee all direction,
knowledge, expertise, formulas, means and methods of application and procedures
necessary, reasonable or desirable to enable MegaDyne to develop facilities and
processes for and to apply the Coating by means of the Process Technology to MegaDyne
Products with the same expertise, competence and results as heretofore accomplished by
PPI and to facilitate and develop improvement to the Process Technology and Coating.
Such duty of Gilmer shall include providing and disclosing knowledge, expertise and
methods not provided by MegaDyne but learned, developed or enhanced by Gilmer and PPI
through experience in use and application of the Process Technology in coating MegaDyne
Products.
4 LOCATION OF SERVICES. Gilmer shall perform the duties required of him in
IIie previous paragraph either in Los Angeles or at a MegaDyne or MegaDynes Designee's
facility in a prompt and expeditious manner, and shall devote such time and attention to
the performance of such duties as shall be requested by MegaDyne and as shall be
necessary to the prompt and expeditious acquisition of the ability by MegaDyne or its
Designee to apply and conduct the Process Technology and the coating of MegaDyne
Products. However, Gilmer shall not be required to provide services at a MegaDyne or
MegaDyne's Designee's facility if travel is inadvisable due to reasons of his health or the
health of his wife. In this event, all such services shall be provided to MegaDyne or
MegaDyne's Designee's employees in Los Angeles. Further, under no circumstances,
shall Gilmer be required to spend more than two consecutive weeks away from Los
Angeles.
5. STANDARD OF GILMER S E R V I C E S .
Gilmer shall provide techf
consultations and services to the best of his abilities to insure MegaDyne
Designee is successful in applying the coating with the same expertise, competence and
results as heretofore accomplished by PPI when PPI was under hjs direction and control.
However, MegaDyne acknowledges and agrees that since the actual operation of the
MegaDyne's or MedaDyne's Designee's coating facility will not be under Gilmer's
direction or control and that Gilmer does not warrant their success nor shall he be held
responsible for the ultimate success of MegaDyne's or MegaDyne's Designees application
of coating to the same level of expertise, competence and results as heretofore
accomplished by PPI when PPI was under his ownership and control.
6. GILMER COMPENSATION, MegaDyne shall compensate and reimburse Gilmer as
an individual for the duties described in paragraph 3, 4 and 5 above as follows:
A. $75 per hour consulting fee for each hour spent by Gilmer in
performing such duties and providing such services.
B. Gilmer's billable hours shall include time spent In Los Angeles,
In travel and at MegaDyne or MegaDyne Designee's facilities providing or
preparing to provide the services required.
C. When services are provided away from Los Angeles; the
minimum daily charge shall be 8 hours per day. When the services require
more than 5 consecutive working days Gilmer shall have the right to fly home on
each Friday and fly back to the facility on the following Monday morning at
MegaDyne expense.
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D. Reasonable expenses for air travel, lodging, automobile rental,
incidentals and meals when providing services away from Los Angeles and mileage
and reimbursement for reasonable mileage and other expenses when providing
services in Los Angeles.
L. Gilmer shall subi nit an if tvoice for all consulting hours and
expenses to MegaDyne on a monthly basis and shall receive payment of each
invoice within 30 days from submission of the invoice to MegaDyne.
•i the event the consulting services are performed by a person
other than Gilmer, as provided in paragraph 1, the above consulting fees and
reimbursement for costs and expenses shall be paid to PPL The below described
"per unit coated fee* shall still be paid to Gilmer; his estate or his heirs as below

provided.
\s additional compensation for consulting Gilmer s)tall receive
payment of a "per unit coated fee" of $.06 per unit for all MegaDyne Products
coated with Teflon by MegaDyne or it's Designee(s) during the period set forth in
subparagraph 61 below
H. I he above compensation shall apply to all MegaDyne Products
coated by MegaDyne or its Designee including any coated by PPL PPI shall reduce
its charge for coating of any MegaDyne Products by am amount equal to the per
unit coated fee as provided in subparagraph 6G above, that is paid to Gilmer, his
estate or heirs on any MegaDyne products coated by PPI. Compensation under
this section shall be payable 30 days from the end of each monih in which
MegaDyne Products are coated by MegaDyne or its Designees. MegaDyne agrees to
provide any and all such records as may be necessary to perform any audit
necessary to insure their compliance with this section. In the event that such an
audit discloses a variance of greater than 5% between what was paid and what was
due Gilmer then the cost of such audit shall be borne by MegaDyne.
I. I he compensation discussed in Paragraph 6G above on all coated
MegaDyne Products shall begin upon the happening of the Condition Precedent or
its termination as provided In subparagraph 1B, or 1C above. Further, this
compensation shall continue until the end of the 10 year period in the event
Gilmer Is unable to provide services due to reasons of health or if dies before the
10 year period is up in which case the compensation shall be paid to his estate or
heirs.
7 SOLE COMPENSATION TO GILMER. The compensation provided in paragraph 6
above shall be the sole compensation to which Gilmer shall be entitled for his services to
be provided pursuant to this Agreement, and he shall not acquire or be entitled to any
ownership or other interest in the process Technology or Coating or in MegaDyne or
MegaDyne Products.
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8. TRANSFER OF EQUIPMENT. PPI agrees It lat it will cause to be duplicated
and/or manufactured all jigs, tooling and other equipment specifically and exclusively
designed for and used by PPI in coating MegaDyne Products and then shall transfer and
deliver to MegaDyne the new jigs, tooling and other equipment it caused to be duplicated
and/or manufacturer for the actual cost of such manufacturing and/or duplication. PPI
will keep its original jigs, tooling and other equipment used in the coating of MegaDyne
Products so if may continue to provide services to MegaDyne if MegaDyne so desires.
9. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. RELEASES AND COOPERATIONS. MegaDyne
acknowledges that upon the happening of the Condition Precedent or its termination as
specified above PPI shall not have and hereby releases PP! from obligations under the
1988 Agreement to coat, in the manner and under the time tables provided in the 1988
Agreement, those MegaDyne products that are hereafter coated by MegaDyne or its
Designees. PPI acknowledges and agrees that it will no longer be the only person
authorized to apply Coating to MegaDyne Products by means of the Process Technology
and that release by MegaDyne of PPI from obligation to coat MegaDyne Products that will
or in the future may be coated by MegaDyne or its Designees is adequate and sufficient
consideration of PPI no longer being the exclusive coater of MegaDyne Products. PPI
further acknowledges and agrees that if it desires or seeks additional consideration for
termination of its status as exclusive coater of MegaDyne Products, MegaDyne is not
obligated to provide such consideration and PPI will not seek such consideration from
MegaDyne. To the extent reasonably necessary, PPI shall cooperate with and assist
Gilmer in the performance of his duties under Paragraph 3 above.
10 RIGHT AND AUTHORIZATION TQ PROVIDE SERVICES, Gilmer and PPI hereby
acknowledge, represent and warrant that Gilmer, or such PP) employee as called for in
paragraph 1, has the unrestricted right to perform and provide, and PPI and Gilmer
authorize them to provide and perform, the duties and services to be provided by in
paragraph 3, 4, and 5 above.
NQN-CONFLICT WITH OTHER AGREEMENT S, The execution, delivery of and
performance of this Agreement will not conflict with, result in a breach of or constitute
a default under or violate any terms or conditions of any agreements, contracts, laws,
rules, regulations, judgment or orders to which Gilmer, PPI and/or MegaDyne Is
subject and will not conflict with or violate any Articles of Incorporation, By-laws CM
other corporate documents of obligations of PPI or MegaDyne.
12. INVALIDITY.
The invalidity or unenforceability of any provisions of this
Agreement shall not effect any other provisions thereof, and this Agreement shall be
construed in all respects as if any invalid or unenforceable provisions were omitted
13. BINDING EFFECT AND AMENDMENT, The provisions of this Agreement shall
be binding upon and inure to the benefit of each of the parties and their respective
successors and assigns, and no amendment or modification of this Agreement shall be
valid unless it is In writing and signed by the party or parties sought to be charged
thereby.
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14. EFFECT ON 1988 AGREEMENT.
Except as modified hereir..
Agreement and all terms and conditions thereof shall remain In full force and effect and
shall be binding upon the parties as therein provided, and this Agreement and the 1988
Agreement represent all understandings and agreements between the parties on the
subject matter thereof.
15. PARAGRAPH HEADINGS. Paragraph headings in this Agreement are for
convenience only and shall not be used to interpret or construe it provisions
16. G O V E R N I N G L A W . This A g r e e m e n t shall be c o n s t r u e d under a n d shall be
go • e m e d by a n d in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
17 A T T O R N E Y ' S F E E S . In the event of breach or default of any of the terms or
conditions o this A g r e e m e n t , the d e f a u l t i n g party shall pay all c o s t s a n d e x p e n s e s ,
including r e a s o n a b l e atlorney's fees, arising o u t of breach or d e f a u l t thereof, whether
incurred w i t h or without suit a n d both before a n d after judgment.
IN W I T N E S S W H E R E O F III J , ,' ,H

i «,„h ,1 I

U J I uxuculod the date a n d year first

above written
ME(3fcQYNE MEDICAL PRQDOSfS, INC.

PREMIUM^ASTIC 5 INI

By yLj>^<y&.
/ I

i j.
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PREMIUM PLASTICS, INC.
PARAMOUNT. CALIFORNIA 90723
Q13) 774^0070

13542 VERMONT AVE.
Q13) 634-3294

HARVEY V.E. GILMER. Ji.
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CONTRACT MODIFICATION
This Contract Modification made this V ^ day of September, 1997, between MegaDyne
Medical Products(MegaDyne), Premium Plastics, Inc. (Premium) and Harvey Van Epps Gilmer
Jr., (Gilmer) WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS under that certain agreement between MegaDyne, formerly American Medical
Products, Inc., and Premium Plastics, Inc. dated June 1,1988, Premium Plastics, Inc was
appointed the exclusive coater of electro-surgical electrodes marketed by MegaDyne, and
WHEREAS, ON March 26,1991, said agreement was modified to allow for the possible sale of
assets of PREMIUM PLASTICS, INC., of which Gilmer was President and sole or majority
shareholder, and to insure the continued availability of Gilmer to provide technical support and
consultation services to MegaDyne after the sale and to permit MegaDyne and others
designated by MegaDyne to coat MegaDyne products at MegaDyne's facilities, or elsewhere,
and
WHEREAS, In consideration of the surrender of such exclusive coating rights, MegaDyne
agreed to pay Premium six cents ($.06) for each electrode coated by MegaDyne, and
WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to further modify said agreement of March 26,1991, to
provide that payment of said sum shall be based upon electrodes sold rather than upon
electrodes coated,
NOW, THEREFORE, it is agreed:
1.
MegaDyne shall continue to pay Premium six cents ($.06) for each electrode coated by
MegaDyne through September 30,1997.
2.
MegaDyne shall take a physical inventory to determine the actual number of electrodes
coated as of September 30,1997 to insure that Premium is paid for all electrodes coated as of
said date and will record the date of all lot numbers of electrodes remaining unbilled as of that
date, and all electrodes coated after said date.
3.
Beginning October 1,1997 and continuing until December 1, 2005 MegaDyne shall pay
to Premium each month six cents ($.06) for each coated electrode invoiced or shipped to a third
party for use or resale, including samples and consignments with lot numbers dated on or after
September 1,1997. Returns and Bad Debts will not be debited against payments due Premium.
4.
MegaDyne shall accompany said monthly payments with a computer printout reporting
all electrodes invoiced and/or shipped during the month with consecutive invoice numbers,
date, total electrodes on the invoice and applicable lot numbers. Payment for said month will
be made within a month and ten days after end of said month.

5.
In October, 1997 M^aDyne will receive credit for the remcrihing September 30, 1997
inventory of coated electrodes not billed out in September. These are electrodes that
MegaDyne previously paid Premium for under the old program. When calculating the payment
for October, MegaDyne shall determine the total number of electrodes sold or transferred
during October, 1997 and then subtract the remaining, unbilled September 30. 1997 inventory
of coated electrodes and pay Premium on the difference if any monies are due.
6.
Except as expressly modified by herein, all terms and conditions of the agreement of
March 26, 1991. shall remain in full force and effect.

MEGADYNE MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC

insom
Its Executive Vice President & COO
PREMIUM PLASTICS, INC.

Bv A y l o ^ / 7/tUc kfrj>4>J
Harvey/Van Epps jeumer Jr.
its President & <5E(

HARVEY VAN EPPS GILMER. JR.

L

